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Discrimination, the Speech That Enables It, and
the First Amendment
Helen Norton†

Imagine that you’re interviewing for your dream job, only to be
asked by the hiring committee whether you’re pregnant. Or HIVpositive. Or Muslim. Does the First Amendment protect your interviewers’ inquiries from government regulation? This Article explores that
question.1
Antidiscrimination laws forbid employers, housing providers, insurers, lenders, and other gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in their decision-making.2 Many of these laws also regulate
those actors’ speech by prohibiting them from inquiring about applicants’ protected class characteristics;3 these provisions seek to stop illegal discrimination before it occurs by preventing gatekeepers from eliciting information that would enable them to discriminate. Although
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Rothgerber Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, University of Colorado
School of Law. Thanks to Bethany Reece, Jessica Reed-Baum, Virginia Sargent, and Jonathan
Smith for outstanding research, and to the University of Chicago Legal Forum for excellent editorial assistance. Thanks too for thoughtful comments from Rachel Arnow-Richman, Rebecca Aviel,
Amal Bass, Alan Chen, Terry Fromson, Beto Juarez, Margot Kaminski, Margaret Kwoka, Vicki
Schultz, Nantiya Ruan, Derigan Silver, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Catherine Smith, and the participants at the Colloquium on Scholarship on Employment and Labor Law at Texas A&M School
of Law, the Free Expression Scholars Conference at Yale Law School, and the symposium on
What’s the Harm? The Future of the First Amendment, at the University of Chicago Law School.
1
I explored related issues in earlier work. Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The
First Amendment and Civil Rights Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 727 (2003). As this Article explains, a great deal has since changed. Among other things,
legislatures increasingly regulate gatekeepers’ reliance on and inquiries about certain characteristics to achieve equality and other public welfare goals. See infra notes 22–52 and accompanying
text. And the antiregulatory turn in First Amendment law increasingly inspires certain litigants
to attack related efforts. See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.
2
In this Article, I use the terms “gatekeepers” and “decisionmakers” interchangeably to describe those individuals and institutions empowered to select among applicants for important opportunities and services.
3
In this Article, I use the terms “protected characteristic” and “protected class status” interchangeably to refer to attributes that a legislature has protected from discrimination by forbidding
gatekeepers from relying on those attributes when distributing important opportunities and services.

209

210

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2020

these laws generated little if any First Amendment controversy for decades, they now face new constitutional attacks inspired by the antiregulatory turn in the Supreme Court’s Free Speech Clause doctrine.4
Part I of this Article starts by describing how gatekeepers’ inquiries
about applicants’ protected characteristics enable illegal discrimination. It then outlines the wide variety of efforts by federal, state, and
local legislatures to tackle thorny problems of inequality by restricting
gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics. Next,
it identifies the potential collision course between these measures and
the recent antiregulatory turn in First Amendment law and litigation.
Part II examines the theory and doctrine that support these laws’
constitutionality, explaining why the government’s restriction of the
speech that enables conduct that the government has legitimately regulated triggers no First Amendment scrutiny. More specifically, the
First Amendment permits the government to restrict speech that initiates or accomplishes conduct that the government has regulated—
speech that does something and not just says something, to use legal
scholar Kent Greenawalt’s vocabulary.5 As an illustration of speech that
is unprotected because it initiates or accomplishes illegal conduct, the
Court has repeatedly pointed to gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal
discrimination: “Congress, for example, can prohibit employers from
discriminating in hiring on the basis of race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign reading ‘White Applicants Only’
hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating the
employer’s speech rather than conduct.”6
In other words, a gatekeeper’s statement “White Applicants Only”
is unprotected because it declares certain transactions and opportunities as off limits to protected class members; precisely because of gatekeepers’ power, their speech in these transactional settings thus does
something and not just says something. Once we understand why the
First Amendment does not protect those statements, we can see that
the First Amendment similarly permits the government to regulate
gatekeepers’ transaction-related inquiries about candidates’ protected
class status—inquiries that enable illegal discrimination by deterring
candidates based on their protected class status as well as by eliciting
the information that facilitates gatekeepers’ discriminatory decisions.

4

See infra notes 60–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of this turn.
See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF
SPEECH 6 (1995); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 59 (1989).
6
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006); see also Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (offering “White Applicants Only” as an example of speech that is
unprotected by the First Amendment as incidental to illegal conduct).
5
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Part II next explains how the Court’s longstanding commercial
speech doctrine captures these insights by holding that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity. It then applies this doctrine to the antidiscrimination laws identified in Part I, concluding that the government’s restriction of gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status triggers no First
Amendment scrutiny because those inquiries constitute commercial
speech related to the illegal activity of discriminatory employment,
housing, and other transactions.
Part III briefly considers the First Amendment implications of
other antidiscrimination provisions that regulate transactional parties’
speech in various ways, sometimes by restricting speech and sometimes
by requiring it. It shows how here too the Court’s commercial speech
doctrine provides the relevant analysis, with its focus on protecting
speech that furthers listeners’ First Amendment interests while permitting the regulation of speech that frustrates those interests.
I. ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS THAT PROHIBIT GATEKEEPERS’
RELIANCE ON, AND INQUIRIES ABOUT, APPLICANTS’ PROTECTED
CHARACTERISTICS
As this Part explains, gatekeepers’ inquiries that elicit candidates’
protected class status facilitate illegally discriminatory decisions about
important opportunities and deter candidates from pursuing those opportunities.7 Legislatures thus often enact laws prohibiting gatekeepers
not only from relying on, but also from inquiring about, applicants’ protected class status to stop illegal discrimination before it happens. Legislatures’ interest in stopping discrimination before the fact is especially strong because after-the-fact enforcement is frequently slow,
costly, and ineffective.
A. How Gatekeepers’ Inquiries About Applicants’ Protected Characteristics Enable Illegal Discrimination
Information about applicants’ protected characteristics enables
gatekeepers to discriminate, intentionally or otherwise, against those
applicants. When gatekeepers know (or think they know) candidates’
race, gender, or other protected characteristic, they too often rely on
that information to discriminate in their decisions about jobs, housing,
credit, and other opportunities and services.8 Consider, for instance, a
7

See infra notes 8–21 and accompanying text.
See Ignacio N. Cofone, Antidiscriminatory Privacy, 72 SMU L. REV. 139, 149–51 (2019) (describing when and how gatekeepers’ access to information about candidates’ protected class status
fosters discrimination); Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 WM.
8
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Harvard Business School study, which found that Airbnb hosts used
information collected and shared by Airbnb to discriminate against prospective guests with “distinctively African-American names.”9 In the
same vein, Facebook recently settled complaints filed by nonprofit civil
rights organizations alleging that Facebook used information about its
users’ protected class status to enable housing providers to steer users
to—or away from—certain housing opportunities based on that status.10
Gatekeepers often acquire the information that enables discrimination by asking candidates about their protected class status in applications, interviews, negotiations, and more. Sometimes decisionmakers
intentionally seek information about candidates’ protected characteristics to inform their discriminatory decision-making. For example, a
Congressional committee report on the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) explained:
Historically, employment application forms and employment interviews requested information concerning an applicant’s physical or mental condition. This information was often used to exclude applicants with disabilities—particularly those with socalled hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, diabetes, emotional
illness, heart disease, and cancer—before their ability to perform the job was even evaluated.11
Even when gatekeepers seek this information for benign rather than
nefarious purposes, that information, once obtained, remains available

& MARY L. REV. 2097, 2143–46 (2015) (offering examples of how decisionmakers have used previously unknown information about applicants’ age, religion, national origin, disability, gender at
birth, and other protected characteristics to discriminate against those applicants).
9
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence From a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 1–2 (2017) (finding
that prospective guests “with distinctively African-American names are 16 percent less likely to
be accepted relative to identical guests with distinctively white names”); see also OLIVIER SYLVAIN,
DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON USER DATA 13–14 (2018) (describing how Airbnb elicited information
from prospective guests that permitted prospective “hosts” to rely on “illicit biases—against, say,
Latinos or blacks—that do not accurately predict a prospective guest’s reliability as a tenant. In
this way Airbnb’s service directly reinforces discrimination when it requires users to share information that suggests their own race”).
10
See Settlement Agreement and Release, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18 Civ.
2689 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/FINAL-SIGNE
D-NFHA-FB-Settlement-Agreement-00368652x9CCC2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRJ7-4LE6]; Summary of Settlements Between Civil Rights Advocates and Facebook, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/3.18.2019_joint_statemen
t_final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/K93A-XAZH].
11
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (1990).
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for the gatekeeper’s later use, consciously or unconsciously, in screening, selecting, or compensating applicants.12
And once discrimination does occur, efforts to identify and rectify
it after the fact are notoriously slow, costly, and difficult. Complaintdriven enforcement—that is, an enforcement regime that relies on individuals to file claims after they believe they have suffered illegal discrimination—is poorly-equipped to redress discriminatory selection
practices and other front-end discrimination. In part, this is because an
applicant denied a job or an apartment seldom receives a reason for her
rejection from a potential employer or landlord and is unlikely ever to
learn the successful candidate’s identity, much less his comparative
qualifications or other relevant attributes.13 Other factors that contribute to the ineffectiveness of after-the-fact enforcement include the limitations of overworked and underfunded enforcement agencies, challengers’ difficulties in securing legal representation, and a wide range
of procedural, evidentiary, and doctrinal barriers to proving a decisionmaker’s discriminatory intent.14 For these reasons, legal scholar
Cynthia Estlund describes antidiscrimination law’s dependence on after-the-fact enforcement as its “Achilles’ heel.”15 The greater the barriers to effective after-the-fact enforcement of civil rights protections, the
greater the value in preventing discrimination before the fact by denying gatekeepers the information that enables them to discriminate. As

12

See Roberts, supra note 8, at 2122 (“If an employer cannot access a particular kind of information, she cannot discriminate on the basis of that information. However, once an employer acquires the ability to discriminate, the knowledge of an employee’s protected status may influence
the employer’s decisions in conscious, as well as unconscious, ways.”).
13
See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1492 (1996) (“In the absence of an
obvious motive or a relevant comparison group, potential plaintiffs have a difficult time recognizing that disparate treatment in hiring has occurred, let alone convincing a court of that fact.”).
14
See, e.g., ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON, & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL:
HOW WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION LAW PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 13 (2017) (documenting how
and why “only a tiny fraction of possible targets of workplace discrimination take formal action
[and when they do] they are likely to settle or lose”); Charlotte S. Alexander, #MeToo and the
Litigation Funnel, 23 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 17 (2019) (documenting plaintiffs’ difficulties in
winning claims under Title VII); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) (finding
that Title VII plaintiffs who file in federal court are less successful than plaintiffs in other types
of cases); Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1282–83 (2012) (“Indeed, of every 100 discrimination
plaintiffs who litigate their claims to conclusion (i.e., do not settle or voluntarily dismiss their
claims), only 4 achieve any form (de minimis or not) of relief.”); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1409–
10 (1998) (explaining “the ironies of a complaint-based [approach to civil rights enforcement],
namely that many, perhaps even a majority, of discrimination claims are missed because the discrimination occurs in the contract formation when claims are significantly less likely to be filed”).
15
Cynthia Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 349, 349
(2016).
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law professor Ignacio Cofone observes, “[d]iscrimination is better
avoided than compensated.”16
Moreover, because these inquiries are generally made of a less powerful applicant by a more powerful gatekeeper, a candidate’s response
may be coerced: either she gives the requested information and risks
discrimination if the gatekeeper relies on that information to withhold
opportunities, or she refuses to provide the information only to be rejected for the opportunity altogether.17 For instance, one employer declined to hire an applicant after she refused to answer an interview
question about her plans to have a family; one of the interviewers responded to her reticence by stating that he “did not want to hire a
woman who would get pregnant and quit.”18 Another employer fired a
worker when she refused to answer questions about her reproductive
choices, questions that included “whether she was pregnant, had ever
been pregnant, or was planning to become pregnant; whether she had
ever had an abortion, miscarriage, or live birth, and if so, how many
times; and whether she was on birth control and, if so, what type.”19
Inquiries of this sort can also deter applicants from pursuing important opportunities by signaling the decisionmakers’ discriminatory
preferences.20 Think, for instance, of an applicant with a disability: confronted by an employer’s questions about her medical status or use of
prescription drugs, she may well conclude that the job is unavailable to
those with certain medical conditions.21

16

Cofone, supra note 8, at 140; see also Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 374 (2008) (“Information-based antidiscrimination policies will be
most effective at combating statistical discrimination when traditional enforcement methods are
least effective.”).
17
See Adam M. Samaha & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Don’t Ask, Must Tell—And Other Combinations, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 969 (2015) (“Don’t Ask, May Tell examples are often linked to onesided worries about the vulnerability of respondents to questioner power.”); id. at 938 (“[O]ne simple reason for Don’t Ask is to prevent unwelcome pressure.”).
18
Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that the hiring committee’s acquiescence to these questions supported the conclusion that the employer had illegally
discriminated on the basis of pregnancy in its hiring decision).
19
Garlitz v. Alpena Reg’l Med. Ctr., 834 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2011).
20
See Samaha & Strahilevitz, supra note 17, at 926 (“Questions are themselves telling, in the
sense that statements correctly formulated as questions usually reveal something about the questioner’s interests or beliefs.”); id. at 929 (“A question is a special device for information collection:
it is an interactive call for information that alerts an audience to the collection effort and that
usually reveals something about the questioner . . . . Questions reveal somebody’s interest in and
comfort with additional information on a given topic . . . .”).
21
See Fredenburg v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep’t of Health, 172 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that the ADA’s restriction on pre-employment medical inquiries and examinations
“prevents employers from using HIV tests to deter HIV-positive applicants from applying”); see
also SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, AIDS AND THE LAW 3–79 (6th ed. 2020) (explaining how the ADA
protects applicants from having to disclose private medical information that makes them “vulnerable to discrimination”).
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B. How Legislatures Regulate Gatekeepers’ Inquiries That Enable Illegal Discrimination
Legislatures often seek to prevent illegal discrimination before it
happens by not only forbidding decisionmakers from relying on certain
characteristics (that is, from using information about protected class
status) in their decision-making, but also by forbidding decisionmakers
from eliciting that information.22 Thus, antidiscrimination laws often
regulate both gatekeepers’ conduct—that is, their decisions about how
and to whom to distribute opportunities and services—as well as the
speech that enables them to engage in discriminatory conduct.23
Many of these antidiscrimination laws include provisions that prohibit decisionmakers from making certain inquiries altogether.24 For
example, Pennsylvania’s state law bars employers from relying on a variety of protected characteristics in their employment decisions and also
forbids them from “[e]licit[ing] any information . . . concerning the race,
color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin, past handicap
or disability” of any applicant.25 After the Pregnancy Discrimination
22

See, e.g., Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 936 (2014) (“[The ADA
was] designed to prohibit discrimination in employment preemptively. The ADA focuses on regulating the transmission of potentially stigmatizing data during the hiring phase because, as studies have found, the most common form of discrimination against individuals with disabilities is
the denial of a job for which the individual is qualified, followed by the refusal of an interview on
the basis of a disability.”).
23
As Part III discusses, legislatures can and do make different choices when drafting antidiscrimination laws. See infra notes 151–176 and accompanying text.
24
Unless and until a statute provides otherwise, the default rule in American jurisdictions
permits employers to ask whatever they wish of applicants. Other countries choose different default rules. See Matthew W. Finkin, Pay Privacy in Comparative Context, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 355, 368 (2018) (“In Germany, out of concern for employee privacy, the employer bears
the burden to prove the question is necessary under a strict standard of relatedness to job qualification. In America, out of concern for managerial liberty, the state bears the burden to prove the
restriction is necessary to further a specific public end grounded in labor market outcomes.”).
25
43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(b)(1) (West 2019). For a few of the many other
examples, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.240(3) (West 2019) (prohibiting landlords and real estate
agents from making “a written or oral inquiry or record of the sex, marital status, changes in
marital status, race, religion, physical or mental disability, color, or national origin of a person
seeking to buy, lease, or rent real property”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502(1)(a) (2019) (same); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2254(C)(6) (2019) (prohibiting owners or others engaging in a real estate
transaction from making “a record or inquiry in connection with a prospective real estate transaction, which indicates, directly or indirectly, an intent to make a limitation, specification, or discrimination” based on an unrelated disability); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4581-A(1)(A) (2019)
(prohibiting landlords, owners or agents who are renting or selling housing from making “any
written or oral inquiry concerning the race or color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental
disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status of any prospective purchaser, occupant or tenant”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-318(5) (2019) (making it unlawful to “cause to be made any
written or oral inquiry or record concerning the race, color, religion, national origin, handicap,
familial status, or sex of a person seeking to purchase, rent, or lease any housing”); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-12(c) (West 2019) (prohibiting employers’ inquiries into “race, creed, color, national origin,
ancestry, age, marital status, civil union status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual
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Act26 amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to make clear that illegal
job discrimination “on the basis of sex” includes discrimination based
on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions,”27 the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission interpreted the statute to prohibit most employer inquiries about applicants’ pregnancy status.28 As
another illustration, the decades-old Equal Credit Opportunity Act regulations forbid lenders from asking about applicants’ race, national
origin, sex, religion, marital status, and reproductive decisions to prevent illegally discriminatory credit decisions.29
Some antidiscrimination laws instead regulate inquiries about protected characteristics at certain key junctures in the decision-making
process. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), for instance, prohibits employers from relying on disability status in their decision-making, and prohibits certain disability-related inquiries at various stages
in the employment process to prevent discrimination from infecting employers’ ultimate decision-making. More specifically, the ADA starts by
forbidding employers from asking “whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability”
before extending any job offer; instead, an employer “may make
preemployment inquiries into the ability of an applicant to perform jobrelated functions.”30 After an applicant receives a conditional job offer
but before she begins work, her employer may pose disability-related
inquiries regardless of their job-relatedness, so long as the employer
makes the same inquiries of all new employees in the same job category.31 Finally, after an employee has started work, an employer may
orientation, gender identity or expression, disability, nationality, pregnancy or breastfeeding, or
sex” or military status); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030(1)(d) (West 2019) (same).
26
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k).
27
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
28
29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2019) (“Any pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specification, or discrimination as
to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification.”); see also King
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[Q]uestions about pregnancy
and childbearing would be unlawful per se [under Title VII] in the absence of a bona fide occupational qualification.”); Snyder v. Yellow Transp., Inc. 321 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (E.D. Mo. 2004)
(denying defendant employer’s motion for summary judgment in light of evidence that it had asked
questions about the plaintiff’s marital status, parental status, and plans to have children, questions that constituted a per se Title VII violation).
29
12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019) (“A creditor shall not inquire about the race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex of an applicant or any other person in connection with a credit transaction.”); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into the marital status of applicants
for certain types of credit); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b)(2) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants’
sex); 12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(3) (2019) (prohibiting inquiries into applicants’ “birth control practices,
intentions concerning the bearing or rearing of children, or capability to bear children”).
30
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (2012).
31
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (2012). An employer may then rescind an individual’s conditional
offer only when the exclusionary decision is job-related and consistent with business necessity. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012).
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ask only those disability-related questions that are “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”32
Some antidiscrimination laws prohibit not only gatekeepers’ direct
inquiries of applicants, but also their efforts to learn about applicants’
protected characteristics from other sources. For instance, the federal
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)33—which bars
health insurers and employers from relying on, and asking about, genetic information in making insurance and employment decisions—
“generally prohibits employers from seeking to obtain genetic information at any time during employment and, notably, the GINA’s implementation regulations explicitly apply to the Internet.”34 Similarly,
some states forbid employers from “seek[ing] [or] obtain[ing]” applicants’ protected class information “from any source.”35
Although many of these antidiscrimination laws prohibit decisionmakers’ reliance on, and often their inquiries about, characteristics
long thought immutable (like race or national origin),36 newer measures
reflect legislatures’ expanding understanding of the wide variety of barriers to equality. A growing number of state and local jurisdictions now
prohibit employers from relying on, and asking about, applicants’ sexual orientation and gender identity.37 Commentators hail GINA—

32

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b) (2012) (limiting employers’ ability to “request, require, or purchase
genetic information” of potential employees and current employees or their family members); see
also id. (defining genetic information to include genetic test results for applicants and their family
members as well as family medical history); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(b)(11) (West 2019)
(prohibiting employers’ inquiry into applicants’ genetic information); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 711(e) (2019) (same).
34
Paul-Emile, supra note 22, at 937; see also id. at 938 (“This provision includes searches of
court records and medical databases. Although the law outlines certain limited exceptions, including inadvertent acquisition, the EEOC regulations emphasize that receipt of genetic information
will not generally be considered inadvertent unless the employer instructs the source of the material to exclude genetic information. The law also includes safe harbor language for commercial or
publicly available information; however, covered employers are precluded from searching such
sources with the intention of acquiring an individual’s genetic information.”).
35
See MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 subd. 4(2) (2017) (prohibiting an employer from “seek[ing] and
obtain[ing] for purposes of making a job decision, information from any source that pertains to”
the applicant’s protected characteristics).
36
See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 476 (2010) (“When invoked within antidiscrimination law, immutability stands for the proposition that entities should not discriminate on the basis
of traits that a person did not choose and cannot change or control without serious cost.”).
37
E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a), (d) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on, and inquiries
into, an applicant’s or employee’s sexual orientation, marital status, and other protected characteristics); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a), (d) (2017) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into
an applicant’s sexual orientation); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s sexual orientation and gender identity); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1), (3) (West 2018) (same); MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.03 subd. 44,
363A.08 subd. 2, subd. 4(a)(1) (2017) (same); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(i), (ii), (4)(i), (iii) (2017)
(same).
33
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enacted by Congress in 2008 with a near-unanimous vote—as particularly innovative in its determination to stamp out genetic discrimination before a discriminatory culture had the time to develop by prohibiting decisionmakers’ reliance on, and inquiries about, applicants’
genetic information.38 And many other recent antidiscrimination laws
prohibit gatekeepers’ reliance on, and often inquiries about, certain life
experiences like applicants’ marital or reproductive choices,39 current
unemployment status,40 credit histories,41 status as domestic violence
victims,42 certain arrest records,43 and veteran status.44 Some bar reliance on, or inquiries about, these sorts of characteristics to achieve public policy objectives in addition to equality goals. For example, “ban-thebox” laws limit employers’ inquiries about applicants’ criminal record
at various points in the employment process in part because of the evidence that ex-offenders’ unemployment strongly predicts their risk of
recidivism.45
38

See Roberts, supra note 36, at 441 (“[GINA’s proponents presented the legislation] as a
unique opportunity to stop discrimination before it starts. It is this preemptive nature, basing
protection on future—rather than past or even present—discrimination, that truly makes GINA
novel.”); see also id. at 472–73 (“[T]he fear of genetic-information discrimination was preventing
many potential research subjects from participating in studies, thereby slowing the rate at which
genetic technology could progress” and “supporters of genetic antidiscrimination legislation also
maintained that the fear of genetic tests was harming the general public—people were not seeking
diagnoses and treatments that could improve or sustain their health. For example, one-third of
the women offered a genetic test related to breast cancer declined, citing potential discrimination
as the reason.”).
39
E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(3) (West 2019) (forbidding employers’ inquiries into
employees’ marital status); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(d) (West 2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
19, § 711(j) (2016) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against applicants or employees
based on their reproductive health decisions); St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 70459 (Feb. 1, 2017) (prohibiting employers’ reliance on and inquiries into applicants’ “reproductive health decisions or
pregnancy”).
40
E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1362 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against applicants because of their current unemployment); N.Y.C., N.Y., CODE § 8-107(21) (2019) (same).
41
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320 (West 2018) (prohibiting employers’ inquiries into applicants’ credit history).
42
E.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-504 (West 2014) (prohibiting insurers from discriminating
against applicants because they have been victims of domestic violence); N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW
§ 227-d (McKinney 2016) (prohibiting housing providers from discriminating against applicants
because they have been victims of domestic violence).
43
E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(1)(A), (C) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and
inquiries into applicants’ arrest records); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.030(1)(a), (b), (d) (West 2017)
(prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s expunged juvenile record).
44
E.g., 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012) (prohibiting employers from discriminating against members
of the uniformed services by relying on military status when making employment decisions).
45
See Dallan F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1082
(2019) (explaining that “ban-the-box” laws seek to address the “grim situation [that] has emerged
in which the very people who most need to work—both for their own benefit and for the benefit of
society as a whole—often experience tremendous difficulty finding gainful employment”); see also
Genevieve Douglas, ‘Ban the Box’ Laws Finding Inroads in Red States, Too, BLOOMBERG LAW
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/ban-the-box-laws-findinginroads-in-red-states-too [https://perma.cc/TB7T-A5ZY] (“Nearly one in three adults in the U.S.
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As another illustration, state and local legislatures have recently
begun to deploy related strategies when wrestling with tenacious gender- and race-based pay disparities.46 More specifically, a growing number of jurisdictions now prohibit employers from relying on, and inquiring about, applicants’ salary history in making decisions about hiring
and pay. Concluding that candidates’ prior pay too often reflects race or
gender discrimination or other factors unrelated to merit,47 these policymakers challenge many employers’ reliance on the (often inaccurate)
assumption that prior pay is an accurate measure of a candidate’s skill,
experience, and responsibility to reject applicants whose past salaries
are perceived as too low.48 These policymakers also seek to address the
even more common practice in which employers base workers’ starting
pay on how much those workers earned at their last job49—a practice
that ensures that pay disparities continue to follow women and people
of color from job to job.50 For all these reasons, these policymakers reject
has an arrest or conviction record that can show up on an employment background check, according to the National Employment Law Project. That makes the potential impact on the labor market
huge for more widespread ban the box measures.”).
46
See Orly Lobel, Knowledge Pays: Reversing Information Flows & The Future of Pay Equity,
120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 553 (2020) (“According to the latest report from the U.S. Census Bureau,
American women still earn an average of 80 to 83 cents for every dollar earned by their male
counterparts.”). The pay gap is even greater for women of color. Id.
47
E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a), (b) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into
an applicant’s “salary history information”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(b) (West 2017) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s “compensation history”); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 378-2.4(a) (West 2019) (prohibiting reliance and inquiries into an applicant’s “salary history”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A(c)(2) (West 2018) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries into an applicant’s “wage or salary history”); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 194-a(1) (McKinney 2020)
(prohibiting all employers from seeking, requesting or relying upon “wage or salary history” from
an applicant); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495m(a) (West 2018) (prohibiting reliance on and inquiries
into an applicant’s “current or past compensation”). Similar legislation is currently pending in
Congress and several other states and localities. E.g., Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong.
§ 10 (2019) (proposing to prohibit employers from relying upon “wage, salary, and benefit history”
in their hiring or pay decisions and from seeking prospective employees’ “wage, salary, and benefit
history”).
48
See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al. as Amicus Curiae supporting
Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 8, Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949
F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176) (“By prohibiting employers from inquiring about
[or relying on] pay history, [Philadelphia’s salary history law] denies them useful information for
evaluating the quality of candidates during the hiring process.”).
49
See PAYSCALE, THE SALARY HISTORY QUESTION: ALTERNATIVES FOR RECRUITERS AND
HIRING MANAGERS 3 (2017) (reporting the study’s results that showed 43 percent of job applicants
were asked about prior pay at some point during the application process); Elizabeth LesterAbdalla, Salary History Should be Her Story: Upholding Regulations of Salary History through a
Commercial Speech Analysis, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 703 (2018) (“When hiring a new employee, Fresno County takes the new hire’s most recent salary and increases it by about 5 percent
to place them on a level within the County’s salary classification bracket.”); Valentina Zarya, Amazon Joins Growing List of Employers That Won’t Ask About Your Salary History, FORTUNE (Jan.
18, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/01/18/amazon-salary-history-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/9NK
L-CDQY] (explaining how Google and other large companies are no longer asking about applicants’
salary history, sometimes in response to jurisdictions’ enactment of salary history laws).
50
See, e.g., Corinne A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male
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the assumption that a worker’s salary history necessarily reflects an
accurate assessment of, and reward for, her job performance.51
In sum, all of these antidiscrimination laws reflect legislatures’
conclusions that relying on (and thus asking about) certain characteristics or experiences when distributing important opportunities is morally wrong, instrumentally unwise, or both.52
C. New First Amendment Challenges to These Laws
Hundreds of federal, state, and local laws now protect certain characteristics from discrimination by prohibiting gatekeepers from both relying on, and also asking about, those characteristics. Sometimes these
measures generate heated political opposition from regulated entities
who resist regulation they characterize as disruptive.53 This is nothing
new. As one of many examples, some employers opposed the enactment
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law barring job
discrimination based on race, sex, color, national origin, and religion.54
And some business owners and associations opposed enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, including its protections for HIV-

Students, 109 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT. ACADEMY OF SCI. 16474 (2012) (describing the results of
a randomized double-blind study that found that decisionmakers often pay women less than men
even from the very beginning of their careers when there are no differences in male and female
workers’ experience, education, or family caregiving responsibilities: the study’s participants offered an average starting salary of approximately $30,000 for the male candidate but only about
$26,000 for the identically-qualified female candidate).
51
See BENJAMIN HARRIS, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, INFORMATION IS POWER: FOSTERING
LABOR MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH TRANSPARENT WAGES 9 (2018) (citing research that employers’ initial wage offers were higher by nine percent when those employers could not ask about
applicants’ salary history); Lobel, supra note 46, at 573 (“The first negotiation difference, which I
call the negotiation deficit, is that women negotiate less frequently and ask for less when they do.
This deficit can be mitigated, though not erased, with a salary inquiry ban. The salary inquiry ban
has the potential to positively shift the process from letting job applicants lead with a starting
point figure to employers implementing a practice of more actively suggesting a fair salary.”); id.
(“Salary inquiry bans can also counteract the negative assumptions employers may make when
women refuse to reveal their prior salary in a regime that allows salary inquiry. This is a separate
effect, which I call the negative inference—when employers assume women who refuse to disclose
their pay earn less.”).
52
And the more that legislatures address arbitrary barriers to employment and other important opportunities, the more inclusive their choices become, and the more those choices may
appeal to those on both the political right and the left. See ROBIN L. WEST, CIVIL RIGHTS:
RETHINKING THEIR NATURAL FOUNDATION 83 (2019) (urging that we embrace a broader understanding of the civil right to employment as one that should not be denied for any irrational reason
unrelated to performance).
53
See infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text (describing certain business associations’ opposition to Philadelphia’s salary history law).
54
See CLAY RISEN, THE BILL OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
220 (2014) (describing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s warning that Title VII “could be seriously
harmful to the conduct of American business” and requesting “that Title VII be stripped from the
[Civil Rights Act]; if that was not possible, then it should be limited to a role of conciliation and
persuasion”).
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positive workers.55 Yet disrupting gatekeepers’ practices that legislatures have identified as harmful is precisely the point of these efforts.
Recall Justice Brandeis’s memorable explanation of the power and
value of legislative experimentation in responding to pressing problems:
[T]here must be power in the states and the nation to remold,
through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. I cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the
states which ratified it, intended to deprive us of the power to
correct the evils of technological unemployment and excess productive capacity which have attended progress in the useful arts.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.56
Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized legislatures’
constitutional power to challenge and change longstanding practices
judged to be unjust, inefficient, or both. This includes state and local
jurisdictions’ constitutional power to regulate the terms and conditions
of employment and other transactions (subject only to rational basis
scrutiny),57 as well as Congress’s Article I interstate commerce clause

55

See LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST U.S. MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 161–216 (2015) (describing some
business owners’ and associations’ opposition to the ADA); id. at 171–73, 204–16 (describing some
business owners’ and associations’ opposition to extending ADA protections to HIV-positive workers).
56
New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
majority opinion’s abrogation was recognized in Wolverine Fireworks Display v. Towne, No. 1210426, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63259 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
57
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018)
(“It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes
of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and
conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”); Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas
Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416–17 (1983) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Kansas
law that regulated gas prices as a proper use of police power based on “significant and legitimate
state interests . . . to protect consumers”); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l Air Lines,
Inc., 372 U.S. 714, 722 (1963) (concluding that state antidiscrimination law does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce); Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423–25
(1952) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a Missouri law that prohibited employers from deducting wages from employees for taking time out for voting); Railway Mail Ass’n. v. Corsi, 326
U.S. 88, 94 (1945) (holding that there is “no constitutional basis for the contention that a state
cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed”); West Coast Hotel
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power to regulate these matters through federal legislation (again, subject only to rational basis review).58 When a legislature bars gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in distributing opportunities
and services, it requires those gatekeepers to use what it believes to be
better indicia of candidates’ ability and merit. Regardless of whether
one agrees with a specific legislature’s conclusions, whether and when
legislatures should choose to regulate employers’, lenders’, insurers’,
and housing providers’ decision-making is a policy question rather than
a constitutional question. In other words, legislatures’ constitutional
power to regulate decisionmakers’ reliance on credit history, salary history, or certain other experiences and histories is no different from its
constitutional power to regulate decisionmakers’ reliance on characteristics like race, religion, or gender.
Again, antidiscrimination law prohibits gatekeepers from relying
on information about certain characteristics in their decision-making
when the legislature concludes that such reliance is unfair, unwise, or
both. And once legislatures so regulate, it then makes sense for them to
restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries eliciting the information that enables
what is now illegal discrimination.59

Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 393 (1937) (“In dealing with the relation of employer and employed,
the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression.”).
58
See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Congress’s Article I power
to prohibit public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of race); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (same); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding Congress’s Article I power to regulate the terms and conditions of employment through the National Labor Relations Act).
59
Note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop did not resolve the question whether a baker has a Free Speech Clause right to discriminate on the basis of his customers’
sexual orientation in providing certain (arguably expressive) goods and services. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719 (concluding instead that state agency had demonstrated hostility
towards the baker’s religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause). If (and only if) some
decisionmakers do have a constitutional right to discriminate in some circumstances, then presumably they would then have the constitutional right to speak in related ways, perhaps by asking
applicants and customers questions about their protected class status. But, as the Court has repeatedly made clear, gatekeepers generally do not have a constitutional right to discriminate on
the basis of protected characteristics. E.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting law firm’s claim that Title VII’s requirement that it refrain from sex discrimination in its
partnership decisions violated its First Amendment rights); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (rejecting nonprofit organization’s claim that state law prohibiting discriminatory conduct by public accommodations violated its First Amendment rights); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam) (rejecting business owner’s constitutional challenge to the Civil Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in public accommodations
based on his view that racial integration “contraven[ed] the will of God”). The Supreme Court has
recognized exceptions to this general rule in certain limited circumstances outside of the commercial setting. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 640 (2000) (holding that the First
Amendment’s implied freedom of association permitted the Boy Scouts of America to exclude gay
Scoutmasters despite state public accommodations law that prohibited discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation).

209]

DISCRIMINATION, SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

223

Until very recently these laws generated little, if any, constitutional controversy. But the contemporary antiregulatory turn in First
Amendment law and litigation has emboldened new attacks on governmental efforts to address sticky problems of inequality through the
sorts of antidiscrimination laws described above. This turn—characterized by some as the “weaponization” of the First Amendment60—has
been described at length elsewhere,61 and includes corporate and other
commercial entities’ increasingly successful efforts to resist regulation
in a variety of settings.
Most relevant to this Article, the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of
Commerce [hereinafter “Philadelphia Chamber”] recently challenged
Philadelphia’s salary history law that prohibits employers from relying
on, and asking about, applicants’ prior pay when making hiring and
compensation decisions.62 In so doing, the Philadelphia Chamber and
other industry associations made several sweeping arguments inspired
by the Court’s antiregulatory turn, arguing that the First Amendment
protects gatekeepers’ ability both to rely on, and ask about, salary history when choosing among and compensating applicants for available
job opportunities.63 If accepted, these arguments would also threaten
many other antidiscrimination laws, both longstanding and new.
Most aggressively, the Philadelphia Chamber claimed that Philadelphia’s law unconstitutionally restricted employers’ ability to express
their view—through their actual employment decisions—that salary
history is relevant to workers’ merit. As its brief argued, “[a]n employer
who relies on an applicant’s wage history when formulating a proposed
salary is communicating a message about how much that applicant’s

60

See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as “weaponizing the First Amendment, in
a way that unleashes judges, now and in the future, to intervene in economic and regulatory policy”); Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161, 2161 (2018) (“The Supreme Court’s ‘weaponized’ First Amendment
has been its strongest antiregulatory tool in recent decades, slashing campaign-finance regulation,
public-sector union financing, and pharmaceutical regulation, and threatening a broader remit.”).
61
See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2018); Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2018); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace:
Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016).
62
See Principal and Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Greater Phila. Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. Nov. 21, 2018) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176).
63
The Third Circuit recently denied the Philadelphia Chamber’s request for a preliminary
injunction of the city’s provision forbidding employers from relying on prior pay in hiring and compensation decisions as well as the city’s provision forbidding employers from asking about applicants’ prior pay. Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 132–
36 (3d Cir. 2020). I note that I served pro bono as co-counsel on behalf of amici civil rights organizations defending Philadelphia’s law. See Brief for Women’s Law Project, et al. as Amicus Curiae
supporting Philadelphia, Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d
116 (3d Cir. 2020) (Nos. 18-2175 & 18-2176).
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labor is worth to the employer: the higher the proposed salary, the more
valuable the applicant is to the employer.”64 The Philadelphia Chamber
thus characterized the government’s regulation of employers’ reliance
on information in its hiring and pay decisions as the regulation of speech
that should trigger, and fail, heightened scrutiny.65 Indeed, the lawsuit
described the entire statute not as a regulation of commercial conduct
that triggers only rational basis review, but instead as a regulation of
speech based on “disagreement with employers’ message that an employer’s assessment of a prospective employee’s appropriate salary, as
reflected in the employer’s salary offer, can be informed by the prospective employee’s salary history.”66 In other words, the Philadelphia
Chamber’s lawsuit attacked the government’s constitutional power to
regulate discriminatory conduct by restricting gatekeepers’ use of certain information in distributing important opportunities.
Some businesses and employers in 1964 similarly resisted enactment and enforcement of the Civil Rights Act because they felt that requiring them not to discriminate on the basis of race interfered with
their ability to communicate their views about race.67 And some employers argued that their assessment of an applicant’s suitability or value
is, and should be, informed by sexual orientation or other characteristics now increasingly protected from discrimination by law.68 Many employers believed the same about pregnancy or disability or age because
they felt that those characteristics predict workers’ cost or ability; some
continue to believe it.69 And some employers no doubt think the same
about credit history or arrest record or salary history—i.e., they believe

64

Principal and Response Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, supra note 62, at 29.
Id. at 25–27.
66
Id. at 16. But as described infra notes 94, 99, 100, 102–104 and accompanying text, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the First Amendment does not protect a gatekeeper’s statement “White Applicants Only,” even though this speech also communicates a message about the value a prospective employer places on certain applicants because of their protected
class status.
67
See Newman, supra note 59 (rejecting business owner’s constitutional challenge to the Civil
Rights Act’s bar on racial discrimination in public accommodations based on his view that racial
integration “contraven[ed] the will of God”).
68
As an illustration, a 1950 U.S. Senate Subcommittee report argued just this. See SUBCOMM.
ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXEC. DEP’TS, EMPLOYMENT OF
HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT, S. DOC. No. 81-241, at 3–4 (1950) (“In
the opinion of this subcommittee homosexuals and other sex perverts are not proper persons to be
employed in Government for two reasons; first, they are generally unsuitable, and second, they
constitute security risks. . . . [I]t is generally believed that those who engage in overt acts of perversion lack the emotional stability of normal persons. In addition, there is an abundance of evidence to sustain the conclusion that indulgence in acts of sex perversion weakens the moral fiber
of an individual to a degree that he is not suitable for a position of responsibility.”).
69
See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which employers declined to hire women they feared might become pregnant).
65

209]

DISCRIMINATION, SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

225

that those characteristics are important to hiring and compensation decisions because they might predict candidates’ ability. As we’ve seen,
however, the Court has long made clear that legislatures have the constitutional power to prohibit gatekeepers’ reliance on such characteristics in distributing opportunities and services once those legislatures
conclude that such characteristics are not—or should not be—relevant
to decision-making.70 The Third Circuit recognized this when it denied
the Philadelphia Chamber’s request to preliminarily enjoin the provision of Philadelphia’s law that forbids employers from relying on applicants’ salary history in hiring and compensation decisions.71
The Philadelphia Chamber also specifically challenged legislatures’ power to restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries that enable illegal discrimination. Although deployed so far to challenge laws regulating employers’ inquiries about salary history, these arguments would apply
with equal force to the wide range of federal, state, and local statutes
described above that prohibit gatekeepers’ questions about religion, national origin, disability, pregnancy, sexual orientation, and many other
protected characteristics. We may anticipate similar challenges to other
statutes, perhaps starting with laws of relatively recent vintage like
statutes prohibiting employers from asking about, and relying upon,
applicants’ genetic information, credit history, and reproductive decisions.72
As the next Part explains, these challenges should not succeed.
Once a legislature prohibits certain transactions as illegally discriminatory, First Amendment theory and doctrine support the legislature’s
choice also to restrict the speech that enables this now-illegal conduct,
including but not limited to gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’
protected class status.
70

See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. An employer illegally relies on salary history
when it pays a salary that relies on the candidate’s prior salary, not when it communicates this
decision to the applicant. If communicating a salary offer that relies on a protected characteristic
is protected speech, then the same would be true of communicating a salary offer that relies on
other protected characteristics like religion, race, or gender.
71
Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 132–36 (3d Cir.
2020).
72
As law professor Charlotte Garden has observed, “[A]lthough many of these theories are a
stretch for now, individual deregulatory First Amendment cases should not be viewed as outliers:
the outward push is occurring simultaneously on multiple fronts, and its standard-bearers include
some exceedingly well-respected and influential lawyers.” Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory
First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 325 (2016); see also id. at 362 (“[E]ven
First Amendment arguments that are unlikely to be accepted can matter; for example, Chicago
reportedly considered a minimum wage ordinance modeled on Seattle’s, but abandoned it in light
of [an industry group’s unsuccessful First Amendment challenge to Seattle’s increase in its minimum wage, alleging that the increase would leave its members with less resources available to
spend on speech activities]. . . . Thus, one problem with the emerging deregulatory First Amendment is that it can accomplish some of its aims without the courts ever adopting it; the increasingly
real threat of expensive litigation by high-profile litigators can stay regulators’ hands.”)
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II. WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT SPEECH THAT
ENABLES ILLEGALLY DISCRIMINATORY TRANSACTIONS
This Part starts by examining why the First Amendment does not
protect speech that initiates or accomplishes conduct that the government has regulated—in other words, speech that does something and
not just says something. It then explains how the speech that enables
illegal conduct more generally—as well as the speech that enables illegal discrimination more specifically—exemplifies speech that does
something and not just says something. Next, this Part demonstrates
how the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine has long captured
this insight by holding that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity such that the government’s regulation of such speech triggers no First Amendment scrutiny. It closes
by describing this doctrine’s application to the laws described in Part I,
concluding that the First Amendment does not protect gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status because those inquiries
constitute commercial speech related to the illegal activity of discriminatory employment, housing, and other transactions.
A. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Speech That Enables
Regulated Conduct More Generally
The government routinely, and in a variety of settings, restricts
speech that enables regulated conduct without triggering any First
Amendment scrutiny. Antitrust law, for instance, “restricts the exchange of accurate market, pricing, and production information, as well
as limits the advocacy of concerted action in most contexts; yet it remains almost wholly untouched by the First Amendment.”73 Nor does
the First Amendment protect solicitations of, and conspiracies to engage in, illegal activity.74
73

Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1781 (2004); see also id. at 1770 (“[N]o First
Amendment-generated level of scrutiny is used to determine whether the content-based advertising restrictions of the Securities Act of 1933 are constitutional, whether corporate executives may
be imprisoned under the Sherman Act for exchanging accurate information about proposed prices
with their competitors, whether an organized crime leader may be prosecuted for urging that his
subordinates murder a mob rival, or whether a chainsaw manufacturer may be held liable in a
products liability action for injuries caused by mistakes in the written instructions accompanying
the tool.”).
74
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection. . . . Many long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence illegal activities.”); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect the
“advertising and selling of child pornography” because they “provide an economic motive for and
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A number of thoughtful commentators have considered this dynamic, explaining it as involving a sufficiently close relationship between speech and regulated conduct that leaves us confident that the
government has targeted conduct rather than ideas. Kent Greenawalt,
for instance, identifies a universe of what he calls “situation-altering”
speech that falls outside of the First Amendment’s protection because
it does something rather than just says something. In other words, this
speech “dominantly represent[s] commitments to action” rather than
“assertions of facts or values or expressions of feeling” that have First
Amendment value.75 Under this view, “communications whose dominant purpose is to accomplish something rather than to say something
are not reached by a principle of free speech or are reached much less
strongly than are ordinary claims of fact and value.”76 This approach
explains why, for example, offers and agreements to commit a crime
receive no First Amendment protection.77
Expression’s capacity to do something rather than just say something can increase with the power of the speaker. This is the case, for
example, of comparatively powerful speakers’ threats and orders:
“[a]nother kind of situation-altering utterance is when a boss gives a
direct order of behavior to a subordinate. That is effectively a way for
the boss to get done what he has ordered.”78 “Such situation-altering
utterances,” Greenawalt concludes, “are not the sort of speech that warrants protection under a guarantee of free speech.”79 Targeting actions
rather than ideas, the government’s restriction of such threats and orders triggers no First Amendment scrutiny.80

are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the
Nation”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972) (stating
that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is an “integral part” of illegal conduct);
Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 388 (2009) (“Fraud and crime-facilitating speech, for example, are thought to
be entirely outside the bounds of the Amendment, and no balancing is required to suppress them
in a given case.”).
75
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS supra note 5; see also GREENAWALT, THE USES OF
LANGUAGE, supra note 5 (“Thus, with some roughness, we can speak of assertions of fact and value
as making claims about what already exists in the listener’s world. Situation-altering utterances
purport to change that world.”); id. at 239 (describing “communications that I claim fall outside
the coverage of the First Amendment” as “too far removed from ordinary statements of fact and
value to deserve even moderately stringent constitutional protection”).
76
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 40.
77
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5.
78
See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Exercise by Private Individuals and Organizations, 72
SMU L. REV. 397, 400 (2019).
79
GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5, at 79.
80
See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 732 (2016)
(“[W]hen speech begins to resemble conduct, such as when it impairs discrete, material interests
through direct processes and through the fault mostly of the speaker, then courts should consider
those conduct-like harms in their consequentialist calculus.”).
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The government’s routine regulation of contractual and other
transaction-related speech offers another illustration of this broader dynamic where the government restricts speech because it does something, and not just says something. Indeed, contract law regularly regulates transactional speech without raising First Amendment
discussion, much less litigation.81 As law professor Rod Smolla explains,
“[A] statement of transaction is the use of language to propose or conclude some form of transaction[,] [such as] ‘I will rent to you this apartment if you will pay me $300 per month.’ . . . . Because virtually all
transactions are effectuated through language, freedom of speech never
has been thought to encompass all use of language.”82 In other words,
once the government exercises its constitutional power to regulate certain transactions, this inevitably requires the regulation of the speech
that makes those transactions possible: “To regulate the language is to
regulate the transaction.”83
Legal scholar Daniel Farber makes a similar point about speech
that serves a contractual function, observing that “[c]ontract law consists almost entirely of rules attaching liability to various uses of language.”84 To help us determine whether the government’s regulation of
transactional speech impermissibly targets ideas or instead permissibly
targets conduct, Professor Farber proposes the following test:
A justification for regulating the seller’s speech relates to the
contractual [as opposed to informational, and thus constitutionally protected] function of the speech if, and only if, the state

81

See Schauer, supra note 73, at 1773 (observing as a descriptive matter that “the speech with
which we make contracts is, in general, not within the scope of ‘the freedom of speech’ and thus
not covered by the First Amendment”); G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72
SMU L. REV. 513, 525 (2019) (“No current court would find that the First Amendment shields false
or misleading speech affecting the creation of a contract from exposing the speaker to contract
damages, or speech asking another to commit a murder from criminal sanctions.”).
82
Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 171, 186–87 (1990); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
U.S. 447, 456–57 (1978) (describing the government’s constitutionally permissible regulation of “a
business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate component”); GREENAWALT,
FIGHTING WORDS, supra note 5, at 83 (“Smolla’s core idea of ‘statements of transaction’ is very
close to what I have called situation-altering utterances, remarks that do something rather than
tell something.”).
83
Smolla, supra note 82, at 187; see also id. (explaining that “the laws governing the language
that must appear on a negotiable instrument[] never have been thought to implicate freedom of
speech”). Note that transactions may or may not be commercial, depending on whether they involve the exchange of goods and services for compensation. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S.
285, 298 (2008) (“Offers to provide or requests to obtain unlawful material, whether as part of a
commercial exchange or not, are similarly undeserving of First Amendment protection. It would
be an odd constitutional principle that permitted the government to prohibit offers to sell illegal
drugs, but not offers to give them away for free.”).
84
Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372,
386 (1979).
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interest disappears when the same statements are made by a
third person with no relation to the transaction. If the same interest is implicated by the third party’s speech, the interest obviously cannot relate to any contractual aspect of the speech,
since the third party is not involved in the contract.85
Law professor Jane Bambauer suggests a related approach for parsing
the government’s permissible regulation of speech that does something
from its impermissible regulation of speech because it says something,
observing that “[w]hen the state has a legitimate, non-speech-related
reason to manage a relationship, it will typically manage many nonspeech aspects of the relationship as well.”86 And that’s what we see
with respect to the government’s regulation of gatekeepers’ speech, as
the government regularly regulates the conduct of employers, lenders,
housing providers, and other commercial actors to prevent discrimination and promote fairness and efficiency.87
B. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Speech That Enables
Illegal Discrimination More Specifically
So far, we’ve seen that the First Amendment does not protect
speech that accomplishes illegal conduct, nor does it protect speech that
performs a contractual function: both involve speech that does something, not just says something. The speech that enables illegally discriminatory transactions thus involves two sets of circumstances
“where the regulation of expressive activities seems incontrovertibly
outside the ambit of First Amendment concerns: speech in the formation of contracts and speech solicitaing [sic] [illegal] activity.”88
85

Id. at 388–89.
Jane R. Bambauer, The Relationships between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1941, 1948 (2016).
87
As Kent Greenawalt explains: “The argument against the relevance of a free speech principle is strongest when the information disclosed is so narrowly specific that no significant subject
of discussion or learning is involved. [The reasons for free speech protections] apply less strongly
if speaker and listener care only about an immediate practical objective and not about any increase
in general understanding or expression of personal feelings and attitudes.” GREENAWALT, THE
USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 47; see also Schauer, supra note 73, at 1801 (interpreting
Greenawalt’s argument to distinguish between speech that is “face-to-face, informational, particular, and for private gain” from speech that “is public rather than face-to-face, when it is inspired
by the speaker’s desire for social change rather than for private gain, when it relates to something
general rather than to a specific transaction, and when it is normative rather than informational
in content” and concluding that the First Amendment is “irrelevant” to the former, and “plainly”
implicated in the latter); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1102–
05 (2005) (suggesting that the First Amendment affords greater protection to “dual-use” information that provides information to a wide public audience even if it enables some listeners to
commit illegal acts than it does to single or limited use information that enables the parties in oneon-one conversations to commit illegal acts).
88
White, supra note 81, at 525.
86
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For example, courts and commentators have long recognized (without constitutional controversy) that quid pro quo harassment—in which
an employer threatens on-the-job punishment or offers an on-the-job
reward based on a worker’s response to unwelcome sexual advances—
is unprotected by the First Amendment.89 As Greenawalt explains more
generally, “Since someone who orders another is not engaging in expression, but is attempting to have his way through power or authority,
a political principle of freedom of speech is no impediment to forbidding
undesirable orders.”90 In other words, the First Amendment permits the
government to bar quid pro quo threats and promises because they seek
to change the terms and conditions of employment through the
speaker’s power over the employment relationship.
For decades the Court has also recognized that harassing workplace speech warrants the government’s constraint when sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment based on protected class status.91 Think, for instance, of workers regularly forced to
endure an onslaught of racial or sexual slurs that alter the terms and
conditions of their employment and signal certain job opportunities as
off-limits to targeted individuals based on protected class status.92 For
these reasons, the Court has stated that the First Amendment permits
the content-based regulation of such verbal harassment as “incidental”
to the government’s permissible regulation of discriminatory conduct:

89

See Nadine Strossen, The Tensions between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the
First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 704 (1995) (“Even the most diehard free
speech absolutist recognizes that the speech involved in quid pro quo harassment is tantamount
to threats or extortion, expression that has long been punishable without raising substantial free
speech concerns in any context.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1800 (1992) (stating that quid pro quo harassment “would seemingly be as
unprotected by the First Amendment as any other form of threat or extortion”).
90
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 85.
91
See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510
U.S. 17 (1993).
92
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (“Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living
can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.”) (quoting Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Expression
in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 689–90
(1997) (“A hostile work environment imposes serious discriminatory burdens on female employees
and helps to maintain sexual segregation of many segments of the workforce by marking certain
workplaces or certain levels of the workplace hierarchy off-limits to women. Similarly, harassment
targeting racial minorities, such as persistent racial taunts, ridicule, or threats, retards progress
toward racial integration and equality in the workforce and burdens the work lives of minority
employees . . . .”); Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra note 89, at 1809 (“When women and minority employees suffer such intolerable abuse, the abuse both interferes with their ability to make
a living, and creates barriers for them that others in the workplace do not have to overcome.”).
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[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed
not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason,
for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach
of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for
example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other
words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition
against sexual discrimination in employment practices.93
Along the same lines, on multiple occasions the Court has made clear
that the First Amendment poses no bar to laws that forbid gatekeepers’
statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only”94
or “Jobs Of Interest to Men.”95 In so doing, the Court has identified
these laws as exemplifying the government’s constitutionally permissible regulation of speech that enables the doing of something that the
government has legitimately regulated.96
Consider, for instance, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst.
Rights.97 There the Court held that the First Amendment permits Congress to regulate certain conduct by requiring universities to provide
military recruiters with the same access to campus facilities as they
provide other employers—even though this law also regulated speech
by requiring universities to send emails or post notices on recruiters’
behalf:
93

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citations omitted).
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights,
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
95
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 379 (1973)
(holding that the First Amendment did not protect employers’ statements of discriminatory preference in the form of advertisements of “Jobs—Male Interest”); see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (citing the facts in Pittsburgh Press as an
example of commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment because of its relationship to
illegal commercial activity).
96
See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62–66. Note that laws that prohibit gatekeepers’ discriminatory
advertisements or other statements of discriminatory preference are almost as prevalent as laws
that prohibit gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status; e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(c) (2012) (prohibiting housing providers from “indicat[ing] any preference, limitation, or
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin”); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012) (making it unlawful “to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement relating to employment . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29
U.S.C. § 623(e) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment
agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating
to employment by such an employer or membership in [such an organization or] classification or
referral . . . by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination, based on age.”); see also Norton, You Can’t Ask (Or Say) That, supra note 1, at 732–
33 (canvassing state and local laws that prohibit gatekeepers’ discriminatory advertisements or
other statements of discriminatory preference).
97
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
94
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As a general matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools must do—afford
equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may
not say. . . . The compelled speech to which the law schools point
is plainly incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of
conduct, and “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”98
As an illustration of speech that is unprotected because it “initiates” or
“carries out” illegal conduct (in other words, speech that does something
and not just says something), the Rumsfeld Court pointed to gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal discrimination: “Congress, for example,
can prohibit employers from discriminating in hiring on the basis of
race. The fact that this will require an employer to take down a sign
reading ‘White Applicants Only’ hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating the employer’s speech rather than conduct.”99
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court again offered “White Applicants Only” as an example of speech unprotected by the First Amendment because it does something and not just says something.100 There,
a 5-4 Court held that Vermont violated the First Amendment when it
restrained the exchange of information (about doctors’ prescribing practices) that would inform disfavored but legal marketing practices (phar-

98

Id. at 60–62 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). As
the Court notes, speech can “initiate” or “carry out” illegal conduct; such is the case of threats,
offers, agreements, statements of discriminatory preference, and other “situation-altering” statements. In this Article, I use the terms “enable” or “facilitate” to describe these connections between
certain speech and regulated conduct. The Court also notes the use of speech as “evidence” of a
speaker’s illegal motive for its conduct, which describes a slightly different relationship between
speech and illegal conduct, and one that is also endemic throughout the law. See Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (“The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.”); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 125–26 (1993) (explaining that a letter
saying, “You’re fired, because I won’t let blacks work here” is “simply evidence of what is unlawful,
a discharge based on discrimination. Use of the letter to prove discriminatory motive is hardly
unconstitutional even if the letter is speech.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, a challenger can offer a decisionmaker’s question about a candidate’s protected class status as evidence
of the ultimate decision’s discriminatory motive and thus its illegality. See EEOC v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1328 (D.N.M. 1998), aff’d, 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t
is reasonable to infer from the testimony presented at trial that the asking of the question [about
disability status] set off a chain of events that ultimately led to Wal-Mart’s discriminatory conduct
of refusing to hire [the plaintiff].”).
99
Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62.
100
564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011).
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maceutical companies’ marketing of brand-name drugs directly to doctors).101 Yet in so holding, the majority distinguished unprotected
speech that the government may restrict free from First Amendment
scrutiny because of its close relationship to illegal conduct:
It is true that restrictions on protected expression are distinct
from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on nonexpressive conduct. It is also true that the First Amendment
does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct
from imposing incidental burdens on speech. That is why a ban
on race-based hiring may require employers to remove “White
Applicants Only” signs . . . .102
In other words, “White Applicants Only” is unprotected because it declares certain transactions and opportunities as off limits to protected
class members. Precisely because of gatekeepers’ power, their speech in
these transactional settings thus does something and not just says
something.103 By deterring applicants from pursuing available opportunities based on protected class status, gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only” enable illegal discrimination and thus can be regulated without triggering First
Amendment scrutiny.104

101

Id. at 557.
Id. at 567; see also Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017)
(“[A] law requiring all New York delis to charge $10 for their sandwiches . . . would simply regulate
the amount that a store could collect. In other words, it would regulate the sandwich seller’s conduct. To be sure, in order to actually collect that money, a store would likely have to put ‘$10’ on
its menus or have its employees tell customers that price. Those written or oral communications
would be speech, and the law—by determining the amount charged—would indirectly dictate the
content of that speech. But the law’s effect on speech would be only incidental to its primary effect
on conduct . . . .”); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018)
(identifying malpractice and informed consent requirements as examples of the government’s constitutionally permissible “regulations of professional conduct that incidentally burden speech”).
103
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 244 (defining a situation-altering
order as a statement “by someone in authority, concerning acts as to which his authority generally
extends”).
104
See Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 652
(6th Cir. 1991) (“Without the regulation of advertisements, realtors could deter certain classes of
potential tenants from seeking housing at a particular location, effectively discriminating against
these classes without running afoul of the FHA’s prohibition against discriminatory housing practices. Congress obviously recognized the key role housing advertisements play in potential real
estate transactions and concluded that the regulation of real estate advertisements is warranted.”); Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e read [the Fair
Housing Act’s bar on discriminatory advertisements] to describe any ad that would discourage an
ordinary reader of a particular race from answering it.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, Crossburning
and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV.
787, 795 (1992) (explaining that law treats speech like “Whites Only Need Apply” as “‘discriminatory practices’ and outlaw[s] them under federal and state civil rights legislation because they are
more than speech”).
102
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Once we understand why the First Amendment does not protect
gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like “White Applicants Only,” we can see the implications for other speech that enables
illegal discrimination. Gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status, like their statements of discriminatory preference,
take place in an environment in which their speech does something and
not just says something precisely because of their power in that transactional setting. More specifically, these inquiries can both deter certain candidates from pursuing available opportunities and also elicit
the information that makes illegal discrimination possible. First, because the gatekeeper’s query signals a preference for a term of the proposed transaction where the speaker has the functional power to insist
on that term, a gatekeeper’s inquiries about candidates’ protected class
status deters certain listeners from pursuing important opportunities.
Think, for example, of an employer’s questions about an applicant’s religion, HIV-status, or pregnancy. Just as is the case when a decisionmaker announces its preference for “White Applicants Only,” these
inquiries communicate certain opportunities as off limits to protected
class members and are made by decisionmakers who have the power to
enforce those limits. Second, gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’
protected class status also make illegal discrimination possible by eliciting information that remains available, consciously or unconsciously,
for later use in their decision-making about available opportunities.
These inquiries do something rather than just say something because
they enable the speakers to limit their targets’ opportunities through
their power over the transaction, rather than through the power of their
ideas.
The next section explains how the Court’s modern commercial
speech doctrine captures these insights by holding that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity, including commercial speech that enables illegal discrimination.
C. Why the First Amendment Does Not Protect Commercial Speech
Related to Illegal Activity, Including Commercial Speech Related
to Illegal Discrimination
By prohibiting employers, insurers, housing providers, lenders,
and other gatekeepers from denying opportunities and services based
on protected class status, antidiscrimination law regulates the use of
certain information in determining the terms and conditions of commercial activity (i.e., the exchange of money for labor, credit, housing, insurance, and more). And when legislatures forbid commercial actors
from relying on certain characteristics in their decision-making, those
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actors’ inquiries about candidates’ protected characteristics then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment
because it facilitates illegal commercial activity.105
1.

Commercial speech related to illegal activity more generally

In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,106 the Court held for the first time that the Free Speech
Clause provides some protection for commercial speech, striking down
Virginia’s law that forbade pharmacists from advertising their prescription drug prices.107 The majority underscored the expression’s value to
vulnerable prescription drug consumers like “the poor, the sick and particularly the aged,” observing that those consumers share an “interest
in the free flow of commercial information[] that . . . may be as keen, if
not keener by far, than [their] interest in the day’s most urgent political
debate.”108 In so holding, the Court explained that free speech protections are “enjoyed by the appellees [i.e., the consumers] as recipients of
the information, and not solely, if at all, by the advertisers themselves.”109
Shortly thereafter, the Court again described commercial expression’s First Amendment value (and thus its protection from the government’s regulation) as turning primarily on its ability to facilitate listeners’ informed decision-making about legal activities. Under this
framework, commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to
illegal activity offers no constitutional value to listeners and is thus unprotected from the government’s regulation, subject only to rational-basis review.110 As the Court explained in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission:

105

Despite the contemporary antiregulatory turn in its Free Speech Clause doctrine, the Court
continues to apply this commercial speech framework. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744,
1763–65 (2017) (discussing commercial speech doctrine with respect to the government’s regulation of trademarks); Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (discussing commercial
speech doctrine with respect to the government’s regulation of retailers’ communication about
prices).
106
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
107
Id. (overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
108
Id. at 763.
109
Id. at 756.
110
See Schauer, supra note 73, at 1776 n.49 (“The Central Hudson approach demands a threshold inquiry into whether the speech is misleading. Thus, misleading commercial advertisements
are akin to legally obscene materials in that they are regulable under minimal rational basis scrutiny without regard to First Amendment standards or values. Indeed, misleading commercial
speech is arguably simply not covered by the First Amendment.”); White, supra note 81, at 527
(“False commercial speech falls outside the coverage of the First Amendment and can be regulated
with impunity.”).
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The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based
on the informational function of advertising. Consequently,
there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of
commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or
commercial speech related to illegal activity.111
In contrast, accurate commercial speech about legal activity (like accurate speech about prescription drug prices) is valuable to listeners, and
thus the government’s regulation of such speech triggers First Amendment suspicion in the form of heightened—that is, intermediate—scrutiny.112
Although the Court has yet to offer a precise definition of commercial speech, the term includes commercial advertising and other speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.”113 Because
the speech that proposes a commercial transaction includes the speech
involved in communicating and negotiating the terms and conditions of
that transaction,114 the Court has recognized speech other than advertisements as commercial for First Amendment purposes, like speech
that communicates the price of goods and services.115 As legal scholar
Felix Wu explains, “[w]hat makes speech commercial is the extent to

111

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980) (striking down governmental ban on electric utilities’ promotion of electricity consumption) (citations
omitted).
112
Id.; see also id. at 562 (noting that the Court’s “decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech’”) (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978)).
113
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973).
The Court has also characterized commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
114
See Smolla, supra note 82 and accompanying text.
115
E.g., Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (2017) (characterizing New
York law as a regulation of commercial speech because it regulated retailers’ communication of
the price of goods and services); Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (characterizing product demonstrations in campus dormitory rooms as commercial speech); Beeman v.
Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 74–75 (Cal. 2013) (characterizing a regulation requiring “prescription drug claims processors to compile and summarize information on pharmacy
fees and to transmit the information to their clients” as the regulation of commercial speech); Carrico v. City of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing a law prohibiting landlords
from coercing tenants to vacate their homes through offers of payment, accompanied by threats
and intimidation, as the regulation of commercial speech); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC,
555 F.3d 996, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (characterizing the government’s regulation requiring carriers
“to obtain opt-in consent from a customer before disclosing that customer’s information to a carrier’s joint venture partner” as regulating commercial speech); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d
1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (characterizing consumer credit reports as commercial speech).
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which the speech should be understood to be part of a commercial transaction. Pricing information is quintessential commercial speech, because pricing is a key component of any commercial transaction.”116
Recognizing that the employment relationship is a type of commercial relationship in which a worker exchanges her labor and talent for
pay, the Supreme Court has identified job advertisements as “classic
examples” of commercial speech.117 Lower courts regularly apply this
reasoning to conclude that employers’ recruitment efforts, interviews,
and negotiations about the terms and conditions of employment also
constitute commercial speech that initiates and completes commercial
transactions.118 Along the same lines, gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics—along with gatekeepers’ statements
like “White Applicants Only”—take place in the context of communicating and negotiating about potential commercial transactions.119
Again, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine provides that commercial speech is unprotected by the First Amendment when it is false,
misleading, or “related to illegal activity.”120 In that case, such speech
is entirely open to the government’s regulation subject only to rationalbasis scrutiny—as recounted in Part I, the Court has long recognized
legislatures’ constitutional power to regulate commercial transactions,
which includes their power to prohibit decisionmakers from enforcing
discriminatory terms or conditions in providing opportunities and services.121 And when a legislature exercises its constitutional power to
prohibit certain commercial activity, speech that facilitates that nowillegal activity loses its First Amendment value to listeners, and thus
its constitutional protection. Examples include speech that advertises
or inquires about the availability of goods and services that legislatures

116

Felix T. Wu, Commercial Speech Protection as Consumer Protection, 90 U. COLO. L. REV.
631, 644 (2019).
117
Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 385 (“Each [job advertisement] is no more than a proposal
of possible employment. The advertisements are thus classic examples of commercial speech.”).
118
E.g., Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d
104 (2d Cir. 2017) (characterizing potential employers’ solicitation of day laborers as commercial
speech because it involves advertisements and negotiations for work); Valle Del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); Nomi v. Regents for Univ. of Minn., 796 F. Supp. 412, 417
(D. Minn. 1992) (“[Military job] recruiting proposes a commercial transaction; the purpose of recruiting is to reach an agreement under which services will be exchanged for compensation.”),
vacated as moot, 5 F.3d 332 (8th Cir. 1993); Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33
S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App. 2000) (concluding that speech asserting that a former employee was
subject to, and in violation of, a non-compete agreement was commercial speech).
119
Greater Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020)
(concluding that employers’ inquiries about candidates’ salary history in the context of job applications and negotiations constituted commercial speech).
120
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980).
121
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
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have prohibited, like drugs and drug paraphernalia, prostitution, and
income tax evasion services.122
As an illustration, the production and sale of any particular substance remains legal commercial activity unless and until a legislature
chooses to make it illegal. Until that time, advertisements for, inquiries
about, and negotiations over the price and availability of that substance
constitute commercial speech related to legal activity, with the government’s regulation of such speech subject to intermediate scrutiny. But
once a legislature chooses to prohibit the production and sale of that
substance (and recall that its regulation of such commercial activities
generally triggers only rational-basis scrutiny123), advertisements for,
inquiries about, and negotiations over the availability of that product
then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First
Amendment because of its relationship to what is now illegal activity.
(To be sure, some listeners very much want to receive such information
as potential purchasers of illegal drugs or illegal services—but once the
legislature makes that activity illegal, that interest is no longer protected by the Constitution.)
2.

Commercial speech related to illegal discrimination more specifically

Along the same lines, a characteristic does not become “protected”
from private parties’ discrimination as a legal matter unless and until
a legislature passes a statute prohibiting gatekeepers from relying on
that characteristic in their decision-making. For example, gatekeepers’
discriminatory reliance on pregnancy (or disability or religion or salary
history, etc.) in their decision-making does not become illegal unless
and until a legislature enacts a statute to that effect.124 Upon such a
122

See, e.g., United States v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 725–26 (7th Cir. 2009) (characterizing the
advertising of materials that advocated not filing federal income tax returns as unprotected commercial speech related to illegal activity); Wash. Mercantile Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687 (9th
Cir. 1984) (characterizing drug paraphernalia advertisements as unprotected commercial speech
related to illegal activities); New England Accessories Trade Assocs., Inc. v. City of Nashua, 679
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Fla. Businessmen for Free Enter. v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213
(11th Cir. 1982) (same); Kan. Retail Trade Coop. v. Stephan, 695 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1982) (same);
State v. Johnson, 324 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (characterizing advertisements for prostitution as unprotected commercial speech related to an illegal commercial transaction); Washington v. Clark Cty. Liquor and Gaming Licensing Bd., 683 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1984) (same); see also United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297–98 (2008) (holding that offers to provide, and requests for,
child pornography are unprotected by the First Amendment because the distribution and possession of child pornography is itself illegal).
123
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
124
This Article focuses on statutes that protect certain characteristics from discrimination by
nongovernmental or governmental employers and other gatekeepers. Of course, apart from any
statutory requirements, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit the government from discriminating based on certain characteristics in its decisions. E.g.,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down the government’s race-based segregation
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statute’s enactment, however, gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’
protected class status then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment because they relate to—that is, enable—the now-illegal activity of relying on those characteristics when
making key decisions.
Indeed, in Central Hudson itself, the Court offered gatekeepers’
speech that enables illegal job discrimination as an illustration of commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment because of its relationship to illegal commercial activity.125 More specifically, it cited its
holding in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, a decision rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a local antidiscrimination law that not only prohibited sex-based employment decisions, but also prohibited gatekeepers’ publication of “any notice or
advertisement relating to ‘employment’ or membership which indicates
any discrimination because of . . . sex.”126 The Pittsburgh Press Court
held that sex-segregated job advertisements constituted unprotected
commercial speech because they proposed the illegal commercial transaction of discriminatory hiring. In so holding, the Court analogized the
contested job listings (which consisted of columns headed “Jobs—Male
Interest” and “Jobs—Female Interest”) to constitutionally unprotected
advertisements for illegal drugs or prostitution.127 As it explained, “Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is illegal
commercial activity under the Ordinance . . . . The advertisements, as
embroidered by their placement, signaled that the advertisers were
likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions. Any
First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the
governmental interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent
when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”128 In
other words, advertising that “I’ve got a job for a man” or stating that
“Only whites need apply” is just as related to illegal activity for commercial speech purposes as advertising that “I’ve got cocaine for sale.”

of public schools on equal protection grounds); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down the government’s exclusion of women from the state’s Virginia Military Institute on equal
protection grounds).
125
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
126
413 U.S. 376, 378 (1973).
127
Id. at 388 (“We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned ‘Narcotics for Sale’ and ‘Prostitutes Wanted’ rather than stated within the four corners of the
advertisement.”).
128
Id. at 388–89.
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All of these statements facilitate illegal commercial transactions. All
thus do something, and not just say something.
So too is the case of gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ religion, sexual orientation, pregnancy, prior pay, credit history, or other
characteristics protected from discrimination by the relevant jurisdiction. Asking an applicant if she’s pregnant (or HIV-positive, or Muslim)
is not meaningfully distinguishable for these purposes from saying “No
pregnant [or HIV-positive, or Muslim] people need apply,” as the query
deters applicants based on protected class status and elicits information
that facilitates illegal decision-making.
The doctrinal recognition that the First Amendment does not protect commercial speech related to illegal activity thus separates the government’s constitutionally permissible interest in regulating commercial transactions from the government’s constitutionally impermissible
interest in censoring a message it disfavors. This insight also explains
why laws regulating gatekeepers’ speech that enables illegal discrimination (like laws regulating commercial speech related to illegal activity more broadly) do not trigger First Amendment scrutiny even though
they target certain speech by certain speakers.129 As the Court has recognized, the First Amendment permits these distinctions because only
certain speakers have the power to engage in the conduct that the legislature has regulated. In other words, only employers and other gatekeepers have the power to make illegally discriminatory decisions, and
only some of their inquiries and statements enable that illegal conduct.130

129

See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64 (2015) (stating that the government’s content-based or speaker-based regulation of speech generally triggers strict scrutiny). But
as many thoughtful commentators have observed, the Court’s First Amendment doctrine justifiably includes numerous exceptions (including but not limited to its commercial speech doctrine) in
which it upholds the government’s speaker- and content-based distinctions without applying strict
scrutiny. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 80, at 695 (canvassing precedent to conclude that “free speech
consequentialism, more than being ubiquitous, is in fact inevitable”); James Weinstein, Speech
Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100 (2004) In summary, the popular view that all content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional unless the speech falls within some unprotected category is not an accurate snapshot of First Amendment doctrine. Speech is too ubiquitous with too many real-world consequences for there to be any such rule. Rather, the strong
presumption against content discrimination operates only within a limited (albeit extremely important) domain.
130
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (noting that the First Amendment
permits the government to regulate gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference like
“White Applicants Only” that initiate or carry out illegal discrimination); Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Acad. & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (noting that the First Amendment permits the government
to regulate gatekeepers’ statements of discriminatory preference that are incidental to the government’s regulation of “commerce or conduct”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992)
(“[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against
conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense
secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up
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For related reasons, the Court’s commercial speech framework also
explains why its decision in Sorrell is inapposite to antidiscrimination
laws that restrict gatekeepers’ inquiries about candidates’ protected
class status. Recall that Sorrell held unconstitutional a Vermont law
that restricted the transmission of specific information (individual doctors’ prescribing practices) to prevent that information’s use in disfavored but legal choices (marketing brand-name pharmaceuticals to individual doctors).131 Contrast antidiscrimination laws that instead
restrict gatekeepers’ questions that elicit specific information about individual candidates’ now-protected characteristics to prevent that information’s use in illegally discriminatory conduct.132
Recall too Daniel Farber’s proposal for parsing the government’s
permissible targeting of speech for its contractual functions from its impermissible targeting of speech because of the ideas expressed. We can
be confident that the former is at work if the government’s regulatory
interest in those statements or inquiries disappears when made by
those who are not parties to a potential transaction.133 The antidiscrimination provisions discussed herein apply only to speech by one party to
a potential job, housing, or other transaction about the terms of that
transaction because only that party has the power to engage in the regulated conduct. In other words, the government regulates these inquiries because they do something and not just say something.134

incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s
general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices.”) (citations omitted).
131
See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 578–79 (“The State may not burden the speech of others in order to
tilt public debate in a preferred direction.”).
132
For a more accurate parallel to Sorrell in the antidiscrimination context, consider instead
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, where the Court upheld a First Amendment
challenge to a law that barred “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on real estate to prevent “panic” selling
by whites who feared that the town’s racial integration would drive down property prices; such
sales remained legal even though disfavored by the town. 431 U.S. 85, 85 (1977). Note that Linmark predates Central Hudson; under the Central Hudson framework, the law at issue in Linmark
would now be understood as a regulation of accurate commercial speech related to legal activity
and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny. The Court has generally rejected the government’s paternalistic regulation of speech for fear that listeners will make unwise, yet legal, decisions. But
the antidiscrimination laws described in Part I apply to gatekeepers’ inquiries that enable illegally
discriminatory transactions, and thus restrict speech that the First Amendment does not protect.
133
See Farber, supra note 84, at 400 (describing the government’s regulation of discriminatory
job advertisements as “relat[ing] to the contractual function of the ads [as offers of employment],
rather than to the suppression of the free flow of information”).
134
Furthermore, the limitations of after-the-fact enforcement of antidiscrimination laws mean
that alternatives—like simply prohibiting reliance on (i.e., use of information about) protected
class status in decision-making—will not effectively achieve the government’s objectives. Nor
would prohibiting only inquiries made with the intent to inform illegal conduct: not only does advance screening of “innocent” inquiries from those related to illegal decisions pose an unmanageable challenge, but even “innocent” queries can deter applicants from continuing to seek the opportunity at stake and can elicit information about protected class status that remains available,
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Contrast inquiries by a speaker who does not hold power over the
listener: such inquiries that “do not accomplish a significant change in
normative relations or other aspects of the listener’s environment” because they are “not accompanied by inducements or threats or made in
circumstances where a positive response is obligatory.”135 Think, for instance, of how the government’s antidiscrimination interest in questions about an applicant’s pregnancy (or disability or religion or salary
history or other protected characteristic) evaporates when the question
is asked by a friend or neighbor rather than by an employer or other
transacting party. For these reasons, gatekeepers’ statements or inquiries that are not “in connection with” or “with respect to” a regulated
transaction do not implicate the government’s interest in the enforcement of antidiscrimination law, and thus these laws appropriately do
not extend to communications outside of the transactional context.136
For instance, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s regulations limit only
inquiries into protected class status made “in connection with a credit
transaction,”137 Title VII regulations address similar inquiries only “in
connection with prospective employment,”138 and the Fair Housing Act
prohibits discriminatory statements “with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling.”139 Gatekeepers (and everybody else) remain free to express any political, moral, religious, or other opinion outside the transactional context through letters to the editor, testimony, lobbying, and
more. As the Court emphasized in Pittsburgh Press, “Nothing in our
holding allows government at any level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to
publish and distribute advertisements commenting on the Ordinance,
the enforcement practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex
preferences in employment.”140
Some may contest the closeness of the relationship between gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected characteristics and gatekeepers’ illegal reliance on those characteristics.141 For instance, some
consciously or unconsciously, for later use in decision-making. See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text.
135
GREENAWALT, THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 75, at 68.
136
See Stewart v. Furton, 774 F.2d 706, 710 n.2 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing the First Amendment problem if the Fair Housing Act prohibited housing providers’ statements of discriminatory
preference that did not relate “to a specific discriminatory and illegal transaction”); IMDB.com,
Inc. v. Becerra, 962 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2020) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, California law that prohibited the general publication of truthful age-related information about those
in the entertainment industry when the law did not regulate the conduct and speech of parties
engaged in a commercial transaction).
137
12 C.F.R. § 1002.5(b) (2019).
138
29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2002).
139
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
140
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973).
141
See Tung Yin, How the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition on Pre-EmploymentOffer Disability-Related Questions Violates the First Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107, 118–19 (2001)
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may argue that asking an applicant about her religion or whether she
has a disability does not carry the same deterrent effect as saying “No
Jews” or “No folks with disabilities need apply”—or that asking an applicant about her age or salary history does not mean that the gatekeeper will rely on her answer to make hiring and compensation decisions.142 (Note, however, that the challengers to Philadelphia’s salary
history law acknowledged that they sought to rely on those answers to
make hiring and compensation decisions.143) But the Court has never
required that commercial speech related to illegal activity lead inevitably and only to that activity to lose First Amendment protection. Consider Pittsburgh Press, where the defendant argued that because sexsegregated advertisements did not expressly deny employment to
women, they were not inevitably, and thus sufficiently, related to illegal
discrimination to lose First Amendment protection.144 The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that listing job openings in sex-segregated columns signaled that employers were “likely” to discriminate
and thus would deter at least some women from applying for male-designated jobs (and vice versa).145 So too do gatekeepers’ inquiries about
(accepting Pittsburgh Press’s analysis with respect to discriminatory advertisements while arguing
that the ADA’s prohibitions on disability-related inquiries do not “automatically deter” certain
applicants in the way that sex-segregated job advertisements do).
142
The Third Circuit denied the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce’s request to preliminarily
enjoin both the reliance and the inquiry provisions of Philadelphia’s salary history law. Greater
Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020). Although I agree
with the appellate court’s decision to deny the injunctions, I disagree with the portion of its analysis where it declined to describe employer inquiries about prior pay as “related to” illegal activity
even though reliance on the answer constituted illegal activity under Philadelphia’s law. There
the appellate court mistakenly (in my view) asserted that contested speech must always, and only,
be related to illegal conduct to lose First Amendment protection under Central Hudson’s framework. Id. at 141–42. The court instead characterized the provision as regulating commercial speech
about legal activity, applied intermediate scrutiny, and then found that the provision survived
such scrutiny. Id. at 142–57.
143
See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., supra note 48, at 8 (“By
prohibiting employers from inquiring about [or relying on] pay history, [Philadelphia’s salary history law] denies them useful information for evaluating the quality of candidates during the hiring
process.”).
144
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388 (“The illegality in this case may be less overt [than advertisements for the sale of illegal drugs] but we see no difference in principle here.”); see also id. at
381 n.7 (recounting the defendant’s argument that sex-segregated advertisements simply reflected
men’s and women’s relative interest in certain job categories and that women might find them
helpful in their search for employment); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496–97 & n.9 (1982) (describing ads marketing pipes and other paraphernalia
as unprotected commercial speech related to the illegal sale of drugs even though those products
could also have been used for lawful activity other than drug use); id. at 497 (“[T]he overbreadth
doctrine does not apply to commercial speech.”).
145
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 389 (“The advertisements, as embroidered by their placement,
signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex preference in their hiring decisions.”); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 150–52 (1996) (observing that even if the Pittsburgh Press ads did not explicitly exclude women from applying for male-designated jobs, they
made such applications substantially less likely).
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candidates’ protected class status signal that the answers are likely to
influence gatekeepers’ choices and deter some applicants—especially
when we recall that once a jurisdiction has prohibited reliance on pregnancy or other characteristics in commercial transactions, there’s no
constitutional value in commercial actors’ inquiries about those characteristics.
Indeed, both theory and doctrine have long recognized that the
First Amendment provides no protection to the speech that enables illegal conduct even if that speech does not always accomplish such conduct. Speech that solicits, or conspires to engage in, illegal conduct is
not protected by the First Amendment even though it doesn’t always
lead to illegal conduct, as the solicitation may be rejected or the conspiracy may not succeed.146 For instance, the First Amendment does not
protect A’s inquiry as to whether B has cocaine for sale or if B would be
willing to eliminate A’s enemy for a certain price—even if B declines A’s
offer or fails to deliver on a promised exchange. What matters is that
those inquiries are likely to accomplish illegal conduct. For the same
reason, the First Amendment does not protect gatekeepers’ statement
“White Applicants Only;” it is likely to deter nonwhite applicants even
though it may not always succeed in so doing.
Gatekeepers’ inquiries about applicants’ protected class status are
especially likely to enable illegal discrimination (and thus lose First
Amendment protection) when they do not elicit information that is valuable apart from its ability to inform illegal discrimination, or when
that information is available through other means or in other settings
that do not threaten to infect gatekeepers’ decision-making about specific candidates on illegal bases. Recall, for, example, that the challengers to Philadelphia’s law argued that salary history inquiries not only
informed their hiring and compensation decisions, but also permitted
them to identify applicants with unaffordable salary expectations and
to learn about prevailing pay scales for certain jobs.147 But employers
can and do obtain more accurate information about the market for
wages through other, aggregate sources outside of negotiations with a
specific applicant for a specific transaction.148 And employers can learn
146

See Kristina E. Music Biro et al., Solicitation generally, 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 153
(Nov. 2019) (“Solicitation is complete once the request to join in a crime is made and is punishable
irrespective of the reaction of the person solicited; therefore, the fortuity that the person solicited does not agree to commit or attempt to commit the incited crime plainly should not relieve the
solicitor of liability when otherwise he would be a conspirator or an accomplice.”); John Bourdeau,
Nature and extent of liability—Liability of person joining existing conspiracy, 16 AM. JUR. 2D
CONSPIRACY § 21 (Nov. 2019) (“One becomes a member of an existing conspiracy by knowingly cooperating to further the object of the conspiracy. One may join a conspiracy by word or by deed.”).
147
See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al., supra note 48, at 9.
148
See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 4 (“[M]any employers use compensation surveys to know precisely where their workers fall in the distribution of wages.”); Joanne Sammer, Banning Salary
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whether they can afford a specific applicant simply by telling her the
job’s salary or by asking for her salary expectations—just as the ADA
permits employers to ask applicants if they can perform a job’s functions
with or without a reasonable accommodation while forbidding employers from asking applicants whether they have a disability.149
In sum, legislatures regulate commercial activity when they prohibit commercial actors from relying on certain characteristics in their
decision-making, and those actors’ inquiries about candidates’ protected characteristics then constitute commercial speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment because it facilitates illegal commercial
activity—in other words, because it does something and not just says
something.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS THAT REGULATE COMMERCIAL
PARTIES’ SPEECH
This Part briefly considers the commercial speech framework’s application to antidiscrimination provisions that regulate commercial
speech in ways other than those discussed in Parts I and II—in other
words, in ways apart from forbidding gatekeepers’ discriminatory statements of preference and inquiries about candidates’ protected class status when reliance on the answer is illegal. As we’ll see, some statutes
prohibit decisionmakers’ inquiries about applicants’ characteristics
without forbidding decisionmakers from relying on those characteristics in their decision-making. Other statutes require decisionmakers to
disclose certain accurate information about the terms and conditions of
available opportunities. Finally, some statutes forbid gatekeepers’ reliance on certain protected characteristics for some reasons and not others, and thus forbid gatekeepers’ inquiries for some purposes and not
others.

History Questions: A Game Changer?, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/banning-salary-history.aspx [https://perma.cc/MPL9-YWP9]. When managers base salary offers on a combination of
an applicant’s current salary and what the pay budget allows—rather than on what the market is
paying for a given position, skills and experience—the hiring process is less likely to yield the best
candidate. With no access to applicant salary information, employers have an opportunity to move
toward a broader approach to hiring.”).
149
See PAYSCALE, supra note 49, at 7 (suggesting alternatives for employers like asking
“[w]hat are your salary expectations?” or describing their pay range to applicants). Note that although laws like Philadelphia’s bar employers from relying on an applicant’s prior pay for decisionmaking purposes, they permit employers to rely on, and ask about, an applicant’s salary expectations in their hiring and compensation decisions. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709B(d) (West
2017) (allowing inquiries into “compensation expectations” so long as the employer does not inquire
into “compensation history”).
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An exhaustive treatment of these statutes is beyond the scope of
this Article.150 Here, I simply show how the Court’s longstanding commercial speech doctrine again provides the relevant analysis. Recall
that this doctrine exemplifies a listener-centered approach to certain
First Amendment problems by protecting commercial speech that furthers listeners’ interests (like accurate commercial speech about lawful
activity) while permitting the regulation of commercial speech that
frustrates those interests (like false or misleading commercial speech,
or commercial speech related to illegal activity)—in other words, by
privileging listeners’ interests over commercial actors’ interests as
speakers when their interests collide.151 The Court’s commercial speech
doctrine itself thus relies on speaker- and content-based distinctions
precisely because those distinctions are relevant to commercial expression’s potential for First Amendment harm and First Amendment
value.152
A. Antidiscrimination Laws That Regulate Decisionmakers’ Inquiries About Certain Characteristics Without Prohibiting Reliance
On Those Characteristics
First, some laws prohibit or delay gatekeepers’ inquiries about certain characteristics without ultimately prohibiting gatekeepers’ reliance on those characteristics. In other words, sometimes legislatures
block (or delay) gatekeepers’ inquiries to candidates about certain characteristics when gatekeepers’ use of that information is not illegal. For
example, some states and localities have enacted “ban-the-box” laws

150

I explored related issues in Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 61 (urging that we
understand employers’ speech about the terms and conditions of employment as both protected
and regulated to the extent that it furthers or frustrates workers’ First Amendment interests as
listeners).
151
See supra notes 106–23 and accompanying text; Wu, supra note 116, at 631–32 (“Commercial speech doctrine cares primarily about informing consumers, and that is the lens through which
courts should determine how much scrutiny to give to a commercial speech restriction. In commercial speech cases, courts should not be applying the kind of speaker-focused approaches they would
be using in cases involving noncommercial speech.”).
152
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (noting
that its “decisions have recognized ‘the “commonsense” distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,
and other varieties of speech’”) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56
(1978)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389–90 (1992) (“When the basis for the content
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been
adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment
protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. . . . [T]o take a
final example, a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others,
because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech that justifies depriving
it of full First Amendment protection), is in its view greater there.”) (citations and internal references omitted).
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that “generally prohibit employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal record until later in the hiring process, such as after an
initial interview or once a conditional employment offer is made” in
hopes that employers will be more likely to hire qualified ex-offenders
if they assess candidates before learning of any criminal record.153
Because gatekeepers’ inquiries about characteristics that are not
protected from discrimination do not enable illegal activity, they do not
fall within Central Hudson’s categories of commercial speech that are
entirely unprotected by the First Amendment. This means that the government’s restrictions of such inquiries must satisfy intermediate scrutiny. Recall Central Hudson’s holding that the government’s regulation
of accurate commercial speech related to legal activity triggers a form
of intermediate scrutiny because that speech has constitutional value
for listeners:
The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by
restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory
technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation
on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s
goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two
criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s
purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as
well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.154
In assessing whether the government’s means directly advances its
ends, the Court has applied Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny to
permit the government to rely on “studies[,] anecdotes[,] . . . history,
consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” to justify its choice, emphasizing that the standard requires “a reasonable,” rather than a perfect,
fit.155 Relatedly, the Court has also declined to require the government’s
153

Flake, supra note 45, at 1084. To be sure, some jurisdictions prohibit both reliance on, and
inquiries about, certain arrest or other criminal records. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
And although, as discussed in Part I, many jurisdictions prohibit both reliance on, and inquiries
about, applicants’ salary history, some prohibit inquiries about salary history without prohibiting
reliance on such information in employment decisions. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.357 (West
2017).
154
Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 564 (1980).
155
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555–56 (2001). There the Court considered a
challenge to a state law that restricted the use of billboards to advertise tobacco products within
100 feet of schools and parks to discourage young people from using tobacco. It found that the state
had demonstrated a sufficiently direct link between tobacco advertising and minors’ tobacco use.
Id. at 561. But it ultimately concluded that the law failed the narrow tailoring requirement because those restrictions operated as essentially a complete ban on advertising a product lawfully
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regulation to be the “least restrictive” alternative, but instead requires
“a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”156 In other words, in these settings the government’s
regulation does trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Nevertheless, appropriately designed antidiscrimination provisions that delay or block
gatekeepers’ access to certain information about candidates where reliance on that information is not directly prohibited may survive such
scrutiny.157
B. Antidiscrimination Laws That Require or Permit Certain Disclosures
Next, antidiscrimination laws sometimes require employers, housing providers, lenders, insurers, and other commercial actors to make
certain accurate disclosures to expose or deter discrimination, or to
achieve other equality goals. For example, as part of their efforts to
ameliorate stubborn and unjustified pay disparities, some legislatures
have enacted laws that require employers to disclose their pay scales
and practices.158 These measures seek to address asymmetries in information about pay, where employers know what they pay their own
workers but workers generally don’t know what their colleagues are

used by adults (due to urban density, for example, no space within the city of Boston would be
available for tobacco billboards under the statute). Id. at 561, 565.
156
See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478, 480 (1989) (“[This Court has]
not insisted that there be no conceivable alternative, but only that the regulation not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests . . . . and
[the Court has] been loath to second-guess the Government’s judgment to that effect.”) (citations
omitted).
157
See, e.g., King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that
Fair Credit Reporting Act requirement that credit reports exclude outdated arrest record information regulates accurate commercial speech and thus triggers Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny, and then upholding the provision under that scrutiny); see also Greater Phila. Chamber
of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the city’s law prohibiting employers’ inquiries about applicants’ salary history survived Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny); Lester-Abdalla, supra note 49 (proposing that salary history laws should trigger, and
survive, intermediate scrutiny).
158
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(c) (West 2019) (requiring employers to provide information
about their pay scales upon an applicant’s reasonable request); Rebecca Greenfield, Making Salary
Information Public Helps Close the Gender Pay Gap, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-05/making-salary-information-public-helpsclose-the-gender-pay-gap [https://perma.cc/5W7E-QHJP] (citing a study by Columbia University
and University of Copenhagen researchers that found a seven percent reduction in the pay gap
between men and women after Danish law required employers to disclose pay data by gender).
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paid.159 As legal scholar Sylvia Law observes, “[e]very story of a successful challenge to the gender wage gap begins with a woman discovering
that she is earning less than a male colleague who does similar, or less
demanding, work.”160 Other examples of required disclosures for antidiscrimination purposes include laws that require employers and other
gatekeepers to disclose truthful information about applicants’ legal
rights.161
These sorts of disclosures have a long pedigree throughout the commercial speech context more broadly, where the government routinely
requires commercial actors to make certain accurate disclosures to inform and further listeners’ decision-making.162 Consumer protection
law and securities law, for example, rely on an array of informationforcing mechanisms to address informational asymmetries between
speakers and their listeners.163
Again, the Court’s commercial speech doctrine supplies the relevant First Amendment analysis. As it explained in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, “the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of
the information such speech provides.”164 For this reason, the Court has
applied only deferential review to laws requiring commercial speakers

159

See HARRIS, supra note 51, at 4 (“In the U.S. labor market, information on wages and compensation is decidedly asymmetric. Employees frequently do not know how their pay compares to
comparable workers, either within or outside their firm, and are reluctant to seek this knowledge
out of fear of retaliation, social norms, or general inertia. In stark contrast, many employers use
compensation surveys to know precisely where their workers fall in the distribution of wages. In
other markets characterized by asymmetric information, the entity with more complete information maintains a distinct advantage.”); Lobel, supra note 46, at 549 (“[A] central innovation of
the new laws is to reverse information flows in the wage market. Efforts to eradicate wage discrimination have failed in large part due to information asymmetries and difficulties in identifying
and proving discrimination.”).
160
Sylvia A. Law, Income Disparity, Gender Equality, and Free Expression, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2479, 2494 (2019).
161
See Norton, supra note 61, at 32–33.
162
See Leslie G. Jacobs, Compelled Commercial Speech as Compelled Consent Speech, 29 J.L.
& POL. 517, 522 (2014) (“This government regulatory power to require the disclosure of facts material to informed consent is not limited to commercial contracts. Consent is a crucial element that
renders many types of transactions legal and enforceable. Governments have always had the authority to define the facts that must be communicated and the circumstances that must exist to
create this critical element of consent.”); Andrew Tutt, Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,”
and the First Amendment, 2017 BYU L. REV. 117, 148 (2017) (“Commentators have been puzzled
for decades by the fact that some areas of intensely content-based speech regulation remain subject
to, at best, modest First Amendment scrutiny. But a judicial concern for ensuring bargain fairness
readily explains the lack of rigor. The purpose of the measures in question is to level the bargaining
positions of the parties, thereby helping individuals to obtain a better deal in circumstances of
significant information asymmetry.”).
163
See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1631 (2017) (“The law of consumer protection has long concerned itself with
information and power asymmetries among market participants.”).
164
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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to make accurate disclosures to their listeners to protect those listeners
from deception, upholding such requirements when they are “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”165 Lower courts have also often applied this deferential review to
disclosure requirements intended to inform consumers even when the
regulated commercial speakers have not engaged in deception.166 The
sorts of antidiscrimination laws described above167 that require truthful
disclosures by commercial actors will generally survive this review.
Despite its more recent antiregulatory turn, the Court has yet to
repudiate Zauderer’s deferential review as applied to required commercial disclosures.168 In any event, the disclosures described above can
also satisfy Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard. As I’ve
written elsewhere, “[G]overnment requirements that employers disclose truthful information about workers’ rights and other working conditions can provide considerable value to workers as listeners while imposing little, if any, expressive costs. They thus can readily satisfy not
only rational-basis scrutiny but also intermediate or even exacting scrutiny when appropriately drafted to achieve the government’s strong interest in informing and protecting workers.”169
Relatedly, note that some antidiscrimination laws that forbid gatekeepers from asking candidates about their protected class status nevertheless sometimes permit candidates to disclose that status to achieve
equal opportunity. Think, for example, of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which forbids employers from inquiring into workers’ disability
status while permitting—indeed, encouraging—workers to disclose
their disability status to explore possibilities for reasonable accommodations.170 Think too of laws that protect workers from their employers’
165

Id.
E.g., CTIA v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 842 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Zauderer analysis
to permit the government to “compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a substantial government interest, and involves ‘purely
factual and uncontroversial information’ that relates to the service or product provided”) (citations
omitted); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n
v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 133 (2d Cir. 2009).
167
See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
168
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (quoting
Zauderer as permitting government to require commercial actors to disclose factual and uncontroversial information).
169
Norton, supra note 61, at 75–76; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech
and the Consumer “Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 438–39 (2016) (urging that compelled
commercial disclosures receive heightened scrutiny but concluding that many such disclosures will
survive such scrutiny, especially when motivated by government’s substantial interests in consumer protection or regulatory enforcement).
170
See Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 643 (2011) (“The ADA is, by and large, an antisubordination statute. It seeks to elevate the status of a particular historically disadvantaged group: people with disabilities.”); id. at 646 (explaining that prohibiting employer inquiries about workers’
166
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punishment for sharing their salary information with other workers.171
For purposes of First Amendment analysis, gatekeepers’ inquiries
about disability or other protected characteristics are distinguishable
from candidates’ disclosure of those characteristics when the former are
related to illegal discrimination while the latter enable reasonable accommodation and other equality goals.172 These measures change the
dynamic from one where gatekeepers have all the information and
power to one where applicants have some too. As noted above, these
sorts of measures to address informational asymmetries between transactional parties have a long pedigree in the commercial speech context.173
C. Antidiscrimination Laws That Permit Gatekeepers to Collect (And
Sometimes Rely on) Information About Protected Characteristics
Finally, some antidiscrimination laws permit gatekeepers to collect
information about applicants’ protected class status in certain circumstances to achieve equality objectives. More specifically, some antidiscrimination laws permit gatekeepers to collect data about applicants’
protected characteristics to assess the success of their equal opportunity
efforts or to determine whether their selection practices have an illegally disparate impact. For example, Title VII (unlike some other anti-

disability status while permitting workers to disclose their status helps achieve both anticlassification and antisubordination goals). Legal scholar Bradley Areheart has advocated a similar approach to the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act in which gatekeepers would be forbidden
from inquiring about applicants’ genetic information to prevent discrimination, but applicants
could disclose such information when doing so enabled reasonable accommodation or other equality goals. Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. L. REV. 705, 706
(2012).
171
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(i) (making it unlawful for employers to forbid employees
from talking about their pay with other workers); see also Lobel, supra note 46, at 590 (“Taken
together, the salary history inquiry ban and salary co-worker inquiry protection also correct a longexisting non-gender specific, double standard—employers often demand secrecy from their employees and usually do not reveal the pay scale of their employees when they interview but demand
salary history.”).
172
See Cofone, supra note 8, at 165 (“[A possibility] for making this method compatible with
affirmative action and other tools that address diversity concerns under an antisubordination logic
. . . would be to condition the information flow instead of banning it directly. When dealing with
explicitly diversity-concerned decision-makers, information could be released under the condition
of a specific use: if active diversity measures are to be established.”); Roberts, Protecting Privacy
to Prevent Discrimination, supra note 8, at 2168–69 (stating that this approach “capture[s] the
best of both worlds[:] [i]ndividuals could maintain autonomy by deciding how and when to disclose
information related to protected status, and potential discriminators would be unable to ask about
protected status unless the inquiry were explicitly designed to accommodate or to cultivate diversity”).
173
See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 163, at 1631 (“The law of consumer protection has long
concerned itself with information and power asymmetries among market participants.”).
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discrimination statutes) specifically forbids disparate impact discrimination in addition to intentional discrimination,174 and the Supreme
Court has interpreted Title VII to permit employers to consider candidates’ race or gender as part of an affirmative action plan so long as the
plan’s purpose mirrors that of Title VII and does not unnecessarily
trammel the rights of nonbeneficiaries.175 For this reason, the EEOC
explains:
Employers may legitimately need information about their employees[’] or applicant[’s] race for affirmative action purposes
and/or to track applicant flow [for purposes of complying with
Title VII’s disparate impact provisions]. One way to obtain racial
information and simultaneously guard against discriminatory
selection is for employers to use separate forms or otherwise
keep the information about an applicant’s race separate from the
application. In that way, the employer can capture the information it needs but ensure that it is not used in the selection
decision.176
IV. CONCLUSION
Antidiscrimination law regulates commercial conduct when it prohibits gatekeepers from relying on certain characteristics in setting the
terms and conditions of employment and other transactions. As theory
and doctrine both make clear, the First Amendment permits the government to restrict the speech that initiates or accomplishes this conduct—that is, speech that does something and not just says something.
More specifically, this includes commercial actors’ speech that enables
illegally discriminatory transactions, such as gatekeepers’ statements
174

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(A)(i) (prohibiting an employer from using an employment practice that disproportionately excludes or disadvantages protected class members unless the employer can “validate” the practice — i.e., unless it can show that the practice is “job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity”).
175
See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding county’s consideration
of sex or race as a plus-factor in promotions to remedy substantial underrepresentation of women
and people of color in traditionally segregated jobs); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding collective bargaining agreement’s dedication of a certain percentage of
openings in training programs to African-American workers to break down longstanding patterns
of racial hierarchy within those jobs).
176
Facts About Race/Color Discrimination, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-race.cfm [https://perma.cc/27C7-5Y47]; see also Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions & Medical Examinations, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (1995), www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/preemp.html [https://p
erma.cc/U8E5-BN9S] (explaining that the ADA permits federal contractors to invite applicants or
employees to voluntarily self-identify as individuals with disabilities for purposes of complying
with federal law that requires federal contractors to engage in affirmative action that may require
the collection of applicant data).
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like “White Applicants Only” as well as inquiries about candidates’ protected class status. Because these inquiries enable illegal discrimination by deterring candidates based on their protected class status and
by eliciting the information that facilitates gatekeepers’ discriminatory
decisions, the First Amendment poses no bar to the government’s regulation of them.

